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I.   Introduction 
 
  The pricing and reimbursement of prescription drugs in the United States is 
important for at least two reasons.  First, from the perspective of US consumers, 
prescription drugs constitute 12 percent of total U.S. health care spending (2008) or 
roughly two percent of GDP.
1 Thirty-seven percent of this amount was tax financed, with 
the associated deadweight loss to finance that spending.
 2  An additional 42 percent was 
financed through insurance, the bulk of which flowed through employer provided and 
subsidized insurance.  The employer subsidies for this insurance cause distortions in the 
labor market with associated inefficiencies.
3 Thus, the financing of pharmaceuticals in 
the U.S. is associated with various types of deadweight losses.  Second, from the 
perspective of all consumers, the U.S. constitutes about 40 percent of the world 
pharmaceutical market.  As a result, its pricing and regulatory policies materially 
influence world demand and hence the incentives of pharmaceutical firms to innovate.
4 
  In this survey chapter on pricing and reimbursement in U.S. pharmaceutical 
markets, we first provide background information on important federal legislation, 
institutional details regarding distribution channel logistics, definitions of alternative 
price measures, related historical developments, and reasons why price discrimination is 
highly prevalent among branded pharmaceuticals.  We then present a theoretical 
framework for pricing of branded pharmaceuticals without and then in the presence of 
prescription drug insurance, noting factors affecting the relative impacts of insurance on 
prices and on utilization.  With this as background, we summarize major long-term trends 
in copayments and coinsurance for retail and mail order purchases, average percentage 
discounts off Average Wholesale Price paid by third party payers to pharmacy benefit 
managers as well as average dispensing fees, and generic penetration rates,  We conclude 
with a summary of the evidence regarding the impact of the 2006 implementation of the 
Medicare Part D benefits on pharmaceutical prices and utilization, and comment on very 
recent developments concerning the entry of large retailers such as Wal-Mart into 
domains traditionally dominated by large retail chains and the “commoditization” of 
generic drugs.    
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II.  Background: Legislation, Institutions and Historical Developments 
  We begin with a brief background section that focuses on important U.S. 
legislative developments.  This lays the groundwork for our later discussion of the 
marketing and pricing of generic and brand prescription drugs in the U.S.  For the most 
part the U.S. generic drug industry approximates competitive conditions with price 
approaching marginal costs.  As a result, we employ traditional microeconomic tools to 
describe the structure and pricing of that industry.  We defer discussion of brand pricing 
in the presence of market power to later in this chapter.  Next we outline the structure and 
distribution logistics of U.S. markets for pharmaceuticals, distinguishing roles and prices 
faced by providers from those of payers.  Then, since any researcher focusing on the 
pricing of branded and generic drugs in the U.S. cannot avoid encountering the critical 
functions played by the misnamed Average Wholesale Price (“AWP”, aka “Ain‟t What‟s 
Paid”), we digress to provide background on the origins, history and evolution of the very 
important and sometimes misunderstood central role played by AWP in various segments 
of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry.  We conclude this section with a discussion 
highlighting the demand and cost conditions facing biopharmaceutical manufacturers that 
make third degree price discrimination an attractive and widespread practice. 
A.  Important Legislative Developments Affecting Drug Pricing 
The pricing of branded and generic drugs has long been a focus of controversy.  
Although Congressional attention to pharmaceutical pricing dates back further, a good 
place to begin is with the Congressional hearings conducted by Senator Estes Kefauver‟s 
Anti-Trust and Monopoly subcommittee between 1959 and 1962.  These hearings dealt 
not only with the thalidomide tragedy in which many children were born with birth 
defects as a result of their mothers taking thalidomide for morning sickness during 
pregnancy, but also with allegations of pharmaceutical companies engaging in various 
questionable practices to realize excess profits.  One writer describes the hearings as 
follows: 
  “Witnesses told of conflicts of interest for the AMA (whose Journal, for example, 
received millions of dollars in drug advertising and was, therefore, reluctant to 
challenge claims made by drug company ads)…The drug companies themselves 
were shown to be engaged in frenzied advertising campaigns designed to sell 
trade name versions of drugs that could otherwise be prescribed under generic 
names at a fraction of the cost; this competition, in turn, had led to the marketing Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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of new drugs that were no improvements on drugs already on the market but, 
nevertheless, heralded as dramatic breakthroughs without proper concern for 
either effectiveness or safety.”
5 
 
Kefauver‟s hearings led to enactment of the Kefauver-Harris Drug Act in 1962, 
also known as the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act.  Among its numerous important provisions were that sponsors of New Drug 
Applications needed to document evidence of both safety and efficacy (not just safety), 
that informed consent was required of patients participating in clinical trials, that the 
sponsor file an Investigational New Drug application with the Food and Drug 
Administration before initiating human testing, that drug advertising be required to 
disclose accurate information about side effects, and provisions that stopped inexpensive 
to manufacture generic drugs from being marketed as expensive drugs under new trade 
names as new breakthrough medications, and that prevented the use of generic names that 
were obscure and difficult to remember, a practice that manufacturers allegedly employed 
to diminish generic substitution.  It also mandated that a Drug Efficacy Study 
Implementation be undertaken to classify all pre-1962 drugs that already were on the 
market as either effective, ineffective, or needing further study.
6   For our purposes here, 
the Kefauver-Harris Drug Act Amendments of 1962 are notable for clarifying 
distinctions between brand and generic drugs and regulating their marketing. 
Another important development of the 1960s was the 1965 passage of 
Congressional legislation adding Titles XVIII (Medicare) and XIX (Medicaid) as 
Amendments to the Social Security Act, which took effect in July 1966.  At that time, 
however, Medicare covered only prescription drugs taken by hospital inpatients under 
Part A and physician administered drugs (typically injections) under Part B.  Part D of 
Medicare which covered outpatient drugs taken orally -- small molecule drugs -- would 
not take effect until 40 years later in 2006.   
Also in the mid 1960s drug wholesalers envisaged a potential growth in demand 
for generic drugs, and a number of them, such as McKesson vertically integrated into 
manufacturing operations and began marketing their own generics.  Part of the 
wholesalers‟ incentive to integrate into generic manufacturing and marketing arose 
because wholesaler margins were traditionally keyed to the price at which the Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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manufacturer suggested the wholesaler should sell, and to the extent generics were lower 
priced than brands, the prospect of manufacturers shifting their prescription drug mix 
toward generics implied a reduced gross profit margin for wholesalers.  Contemporary 
industry analysts opined that the generic manufacturing and marketing window for 
wholesalers would, however, likely be a temporary one, as new specialized generic 
manufacturers entered the prescription drug market and marketed directly to the retail and 
hospital sectors.
7  We discuss changing dynamics in drug distribution channels, 
particularly the impacts of information and communication technologies, later on in this 
chapter.          
A subsequent important legislative development was the Hatch-Waxman Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.  It established the 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) pathway that required only establishing 
bioequivalence with the reference drug (eliminating the need to establish safety and 
efficacy anew) and compliance with Good Manufacturing Practices.
8  It specified that 
when a generic manufacturer submitted an ANDA and successfully established 
bioequivalence with the originator drug and complied with Good Manufacturing 
Procedures, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) was authorized to approve the 
ANDA.  For oral solid small molecules, along with ANDA approval the FDA assigns the 
generic an A (therapeutically equivalent) or B (drug not considered therapeutically 
equivalent) rating with the pioneer, thereby enabling pharmacists to substitute a generic 
for the brand prescription.
9  It is worth noting that the FDA‟s A rating essentially grants 
complete interchangeabilty between brand and generic, or what economists would call 
almost “perfect substitutability” of the brand and generic.
10  A weaker form of 
substitutability between different molecules occurs when, for example, payers (not 
necessarily the FDA) term two different molecules as being “therapeutically 
substitutable.”      
B.   Pricing of Generic Drugs 
As noted above, the traditional microeconomic theory toolkit is mostly sufficient 
for analyzing generic drug pricing.  For the most part one can view generic drug 
manufacturers as operating in competitive markets, taking the price of generic drugs as 
given, and facing no buyer with monopsony power.    Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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For most small molecule pharmaceuticals (i.e., most tablets or capsules), the 
process of undertaking clinical trials to establish bioequivalence and meet ANDA 
requirements is inexpensive relative to establishing efficacy; estimates range from $2-5 
million.
11  With entry being relatively inexpensive and the regulatory pathway open and 
clear, one would expect extensive generic entry following patent expiration, with price 
eventually falling to marginal cost.  Indeed, that is what numerous researchers have 
found.  Frank and Salkever [1997], Reiffen and Ward [2005], Atanu, Grabowski, 
Birnbaum, Greenberg and Bizan [2006], and Berndt, Mortimer, Bhattacharjya, Parece 
and Tuttle [2007] all find that price and the extent of generic entry are jointly determined.  
Reiffen and Ward also report that generic price continues to fall as the number of generic 
entrants increases up to five or so, but thereafter levels off.  A common finding from the 
literature is that the number of generic entrants increases with the size of the branded 
molecule market (measured in dollars) prior to the loss of patent protection; generic entry 
of oral solids tends to be more extensive than that of injectables.  Scott Morton [1997, 
1999] considers various aspects of generic entry decisions in detail, and finds that generic 
firms tend to specialize in the therapeutic classes in which they have previous experience. 
Three notable exceptions to envisaging the generic drug industry as being 
competitive with price approximating marginal cost are worth noting, each involving 
some aspect of market power.  First, under the terms of the Hatch-Waxman Act, before or 
after submitting its ANDA, a generic manufacturer who successfully prevails in 
challenging the brand innovator‟s patent claims can be granted 180 days of exclusivity 
during which time no other ANDA holder for that molecule/strength can market its 
product.  This is typically called a Paragraph IV entry.   
With no further ANDA entry permitted for a period of 180 days, the market for 
that particular molecule/strength becomes a duopoly, with the branded and single generic 
as competitors.  In such a duopoly environment, the price of generics is generally only 
10-20% below that of the brand.
12  A variant of this occurs when the branded 
manufacturer enters into an agreement with a generic manufacturer (other than the 
successful Paragraph IV entrant) to market the molecule/strength under the branded 
product‟s original New Drug Application (not an ANDA).  This has been dubbed 
“authorized generic entry”, and it enables the branded company to continue pricing its Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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branded product high after loss of patent protection, and rather than ceding all generic 
sales to the single successful Paragraph IV entrant, it can share generic revenues with its 
collaborating “authorized generic” entrant in a triopoly environment for up to 180 days.
13  
Following the 180 day Paragraph IV exclusivity period, generic entry tends to be 
substantial, with generic prices falling sharply.  The presence of authorized generic entry 
does not appear to adversely impact the extent of subsequent generic entry post-180 day 
exclusivity, although it might do so in cases where the size of the potential generic 
market is small.
14 
A second exception involves what is called “branded generics”.  For example, a 
common feature observed in antidepressant markets in the 1980s following loss of patent 
protection was primarily branded manufacturers other than the original patent holder 
entering with similar strength (or with the off-patent molecule in combination with other 
molecules) therapeutic formulations but branded with other than the generic name.
 15  
Branded generics attempt to differentiate themselves from both the original branded 
patent holder and other generic entrants, and charge prices in between the generic and the 
original brand.  While not particularly successful in the last few decades, branded 
generics may be rejuvenated in the context of biosimilars, as we discuss next. 
A third potential exception to generic or patent expiration follow-on markets 
being approximated as competitive with price close to marginal cost involves biologics, 
as distinct from small molecules.  Prior to 2010 there was no procedure for generic entry 
of biologics, now dubbed “biosimilars.”  Section 7002 of the 2010 health care reform 
legislation (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), however, established the 
authority for the licensure of biosimilars, which are intended to provide price competition 
for the original biologic; it granted the original biologic 12 years of market exclusivity. 
The term biosimilar rather than generic drug is used not only because biologics 
are considerably larger and more complex molecules than are synthesized small 
molecules, and tend to be more challenging and costly to manufacture,
16  but also because 
their larger size and complexity implies possibilities of their surfaces folding in different 
ways, thereby not blocking receptor sites as uniformly as synthesized small molecules.  
Hence, characterizing them analytically and establishing bioequivalence between the 
original biologic and an attempted follow-on biologic entrant raises difficult scientific Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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issues and challenges with important economic implications.  In particular, because of 
greater manufacturing costs and complexity, difficulties in establishing bioequivalence 
and meeting other regulatory requirements, it is widely anticipated that the extent of 
follow-on biologic entry subsequent to loss of patent protection will be considerably less 
than has historically been observed with chemically synthesized small molecules.
17  A 
consequence of this is that biosimilars are unlikely to experience the same degree of price 
competition following loss of patent protection as brands that A or B-rated bioequivalent 
small molecules have encountered in the US.
18  Instead, as the 2010 health care reform 
legislation is implemented, one will likely see competition from something akin to 
“branded generics,” products that are less than perfectly substitutable with the branded 
biologic pioneers, but nonetheless positioned to act as possible therapeutic equivalents.  
Hence, price declines of biologics following loss of patent protection are likely to be 
notably smaller than have occurred historically with generic small molecules. 
C.  Distribution Channel Logistics and Pricing 
Before initiating our discussion of the supply prices of branded drugs, we believe 
it useful to outline several logistical and transactional aspects of biopharmaceuticals, both 
generic and brand, including use of a variety of distribution channels. Observed prices of 
even the same biopharmaceutical will differ in various transactions simply because the 
drug pathway involves distinct distribution channel transactions.  
It is important to distinguish consumers, providers and payers.  We designate 
providers of pharmaceutical products as those entities that actually purchase and take 
both title and physical possession of biopharmaceutical products, either directly or 
indirectly providing them to consumers.  Providers include retail and mail order 
pharmacies, various wholesalers, hospitals, and physician offices that administer 
medicines (typically by intravenous, infusion or injection).  In comparison, payers such 
as health care plans, pharmaceutical benefit managers, most group purchasing 
organizations and employers, typically do not take title to and physical possession of drug 
products, but instead reimburse providers for the purchases they or their beneficiaries 
have made.  Despite their name payers do not actually purchase drugs, and the prices 
involved in the transactions in which payers engage are not the purchase prices of drugs 
from manufacturers or wholesalers.   Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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Brand manufacturers of small molecules sell their drugs primarily to certain 
providers, particularly wholesalers and chain warehouses, and have relatively limited 
direct sales to hospitals, retail and mail order pharmacies, and physician offices.
19  The 
price at which brand manufacturers sell to wholesalers and chain warehouses is generally 
the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC), a published list price, minus a few percent 
discount for prompt payment and other incentives. In turn, wholesalers sell branded small 
molecules to retail and mail order pharmacies, usually at the present time at a few percent 
above their WAC, and at a 15-20% or larger discount off of what is known as the 
misleadingly named Average Wholesale Price (“AWP”).
20   
Wholesalers face different markets for branded and generic drugs.  They can 
purchase branded drugs only from a single manufacturer, whereas they can purchase 
most generic drugs from many manufacturers.  As a result, they can create price 
competition among the various generic manufacturers of a particular small molecule.  
Large retail chains also buy directly from generic manufacturers, pitting one generic 
manufacturer against others to obtain the lowest generic price.  As a result, gross profit 
margins for both wholesalers and large retail chains are larger for generic than branded 
small molecules.
21     
In contrast, many biologics are administered via injection or infusion by health 
care providers (i.e., physicians and nurses), rather than being patient self-administered 
oral tablets or capsules purchased from retail or mail order pharmacies.  As a result, 
manufacturers of branded biologics sometimes sell directly to hospitals and physician 
offices rather than to the wholesalers to which the branded small molecule manufacturers 
usually sell.  Firms known as “specialty pharmaceuticals,” however, often provide 
wholesaler-type intermediary services between biologic manufacturers and providers.  
Although the practice is not as firmly ingrained as it is with branded small molecules, 
biologic manufacturers generally sell products to the specialty pharmaceutical firms at a 
slightly discounted WAC, and often at slightly higher prices to the providers who are 
buying directly. 
Over the years a variety of intermediary services for all drugs have increasingly 
been provided by pharmaceutical benefit managers (“PBMs”).  Services provided by 
PBMs include benefit design and contracting with manufacturers for third party payers Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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(insurers, employers, governments); pharmacy network formation; real time prescription 
benefit eligibility certification and claims processing; formulary management and rebate 
negotiations with manufacturers, payers and pharmacies; drug utilization screening and 
review; operation of mail order pharmacies, and other functions.  Although PBMs are a 
critical component of the third party drug benefit system, in general they do not directly 
purchase prescription drugs from manufacturers, take title or physical possession of the 
product, or provide the drug product to the patient.  Rather, they are best viewed as 
intermediary payers.  If, however, the PBM owns a mail order pharmacy, as large PBMs 
do, then the PBM‟s mail order pharmacy may perform provider services directly to 
patients. 
Because of the multitude of agents involved in pharmaceutical transactions, a 
variety of ex post reconciliations and “true ups” occur.  One of these is the chargeback.  
It arises because, as noted above, few brand manufacturers sell directly to providers, 
instead distributing their products primarily via wholesalers.  Suppose that a 
manufacturer negotiates with a third party payer (“TPP”) or group purchasing 
organization (“GPO”), which does not take title to the product, a discounted price that is 
below the price the manufacturer charged the wholesaler.  Pharmacies contracting with 
the TPP or members of the GPO purchase from the wholesaler at the contractually agreed 
on TPP/GPO price.  The chargeback is the difference between the manufacturer‟s price 
charged the wholesaler and the manufacturer‟s contract price with the TPP/GPO and 
makes the wholesaler whole.  Typically the wholesaler submits chargeback requests to 
the manufacturer on a regular basis, and the manufacturer transfers the invoiced 
chargeback to the wholesaler via electronic data interchange.   
In addition to chargebacks, various forms of rebates are common in 
pharmaceutical transactions.   Manufacturers contracting with TPPs/GPOs and PBMs 
often have market share or absolute number/dollar provisions that provide financial 
incentives for the TPPs/GPOs/PBMs to meet certain targets. e.g., a 10% of WAC rebate 
if brand x attains 40% of all dispensed prescriptions in a given, well-defined therapeutic 
class, and 15% if it attains 50%.  Depending on the extent to which targets are attained or 
exceeded, manufacturers pay these organizations rebates.  Since whether such target 
thresholds have been reached can typically only be determined retrospectively, these Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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rebates (or at least a portion of them) are paid ex post at regular intervals.  PBM contracts 
with network pharmacies often contain similar rebate provisions, as do PBM contracts 
with TPPs.
22 
To this point we have not dealt with prices paid by consumers, be they completely 
cash paying uninsured or the much larger number of consumers whose insurance covers 
drugs.  Regarding the latter, TPPs have attempted to constrain rising pharmaceutical 
expenditures by exerting financial pressures on the patient, altering cost-sharing 
provisions between the insurer and the insured consumer.  Initially drug insurance 
involved the insured‟s paying a copayment (a fixed dollar amount, usually for a month‟s 
supply) or a coinsurance rate (a fixed percentage of the total cost) irrespective of the 
specific drug bought.  Drug insurance also involved the insurer‟s establishing a 
formulary, which was simply a list of drugs covered by the insurer.  Formularies could be 
open or closed.  Open formularies essentially cover all drugs approved by the FDA, 
whereas closed formularies cover only a subset of FDA approved drugs; for those drugs 
not covered, the insured must pay the full pharmacy price.   
Drug benefit cost-sharing provisions have evolved over the last two decades, with 
the key innovation being to charge the customer different amounts for different drugs.  
When drug insurance was first introduced, the consumer typically paid the same 
coinsurance rate for any drug, but now the price paid by the customer depends on which 
“tier” the drug is placed.  The first tiered plans typically had two tiers, but as we come to 
in Section IV, now there are usually three or even four.  In such an arrangement, generic 
drugs will typically be on the lowest or cheapest (to the consumer) tier.  When a customer 
brings a prescription for a generic drug on the first tier to the pharmacy, the customer 
pays the pharmacy a relatively small amount, say $10 for a 30-day prescription. The TPP 
or its PBM pays the pharmacy the remaining cost of the drug and a dispensing fee.  
Relatively few benefit plans have many branded drugs on their first tiers, although 
occasionally a formulary will have an off-patent brand on the first tier.   
Depending on the result of negotiations among the manufacturer and the PBM or 
TPP, for a given therapeutic class of drugs (e.g., anti-depressants) the insurer has one or 
more preferred brands on the second tier.  A customer presenting a prescription to a Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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pharmacy for a branded drug on the second tier faces a larger copayment, say $25 for a 
30-day prescription, with the TPP or its PBM picking up the balance.   
Brands for which the TPP or PBM was unable to negotiate a favorable price (from 
its perspective) are placed on the third tier.   To incentivize customers and their 
physicians to substitute away from these non-preferred brands, copayments for third tier 
brands are considerably higher than for the second tier, say, $50 for a 30-day 
prescription.  Finally, certain very costly drugs, such as the oncology and rheumatoid 
arthritis biologics that can cost thousands of dollars per month, may be placed on a fourth 
tier.  Even if the lower three tiers have increasingly higher copayments, the fourth tier, if 
the plan has four tiers, almost always has a coinsurance rate, perhaps 20-30%. 
A relatively recent innovation involves prescriptions for maintenance drugs 
(drugs used to treat chronic rather than acute or episodic conditions).  TPPs and PBMs 
now incentivize customers to obtain such drugs via mail order in 90 day prescriptions by 
making the copayments for 90 day prescriptions less than three times the 30 day 
copayment, often twice the 30 day copayment.
23  Another, even more recent innovation is 
to reduce cost sharing amounts for specific drugs (or specific classes of drugs) to 
encourage compliance and potentially reduce hospital and physician costs.  We discuss 
this development below. 
D.  The Long-Lived, Ubiquitous but Misnamed Average Wholesale Price 
In almost all brand drug transactions, reference is made to a “price” called the 
Average Wholesale Price (“AWP”).  Although the role of AWP as a reference or 
benchmark price from which various discounts are taken is critical for contracting in 
these markets, the AWP is sometimes misunderstood, in part because it is neither an 
average nor a wholesale price.
24     
D.1  The Creation and Evolution of Average Wholesale Price 
We now digress, initially to discuss the creation and evolution of the Average 
Wholesale Price “AWP”) as a reference or benchmark for the pricing of numerous 
pharmaceutical transactions.  Following Congressional passage of the federal Medicaid 
enabling legislation in 1965, the various states were required to develop beneficiary and 
reimbursement practices, subject to approval from the Health Care Financing 
Administration (“HCFA”, now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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“CMS”).  At that time, numerous small wholesalers existed, and while prices of 
prescription drugs were very low by current standards, they varied enormously.  Large 
third party payers were coping with how to reimburse pharmacies for prescription 
pharmaceuticals they acquired and dispensed.  Around the same time, in 1967 the United 
Auto Workers reached a precedent-setting agreement with Ford Motor Company 
enshrining drug insurance benefits as part of Ford employees‟ benefit package.  In both 
the private and public sectors, therefore, insurance covering prescription pharmaceuticals 
was becoming an increasingly important benefit.  How would such drug insurance 
benefits be administered and claims processed efficiently among private and public 
payers, pharmacies and beneficiaries? 
According to George Pennebaker [1998], early on California Medicaid program 
designers, who were conceiving a formula to facilitate reimbursement to pharmacies for 
costs incurred in dispensing prescription drugs to beneficiaries, focused on a total or 
aggregate reimbursement that consisted of a dispensing fee plus a reimbursement of 
acquisition costs.  Regarding dispensing fees, under the leadership of Bill Apple, the 
American Pharmaceutical Association advocated a flat professional fee per dispensed 
prescription, independent of the pharmacy‟s acquisition cost (thereby covering overhead 
costs and mitigating moral hazard issues to dispense ever costlier drugs, but not 
reimbursing pharmacies for inventory holding costs).  Third party payers were 
sympathetic to this notion, as were pharmacy associations, but each struggled with how 
to determine pharmacy acquisition costs.  For large payers, the number of invoice 
transactions was in the millions.  Computers and information communication systems had 
not yet diffused widely.  Third party public and private payers believed it was infeasible 
to check each pharmacy‟s invoices, but allowing pharmacies simply to declare their costs 
to be whatever they decided would create perverse incentives. A standard or reference 
price was needed to facilitate pharmaceutical claims processing and reimbursement.  
Officials at MediCal, California‟s Medicaid prescription drug program, had 
helped in writing the federal Title XIX legislation.
25  Pennebaker, the first pharmacist 
hired by MediCal in November 1966, had to deal with reimbursing about 5,000 
pharmacies who dispensed drugs to three million MediCal beneficiaries, at that time the 
largest third party drug benefit program in the nation.  The major private sector program Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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with prescription drug benefits at the time was Blue Shield.  Its reimbursement method 
required the pharmacy laboriously to fill out a four part carbon paper form, with the 
physician and pharmacy each keeping one copy, with two copies sent to Blue Shield.  
According to Pennebaker, after checking with several large wholesalers (Amerisource, 
Bergen Brunswick and McKesson), several independent wholesalers, and Blue Shield 
pharmacy analyst Bill Thompson, Pennebaker and his fellow MediCal pharmacist Vic 
Boisseree estimated informally, without any extensive mathematical calculations or 
precision, that pharmacies were “roughly on average with considerable variability” being 
reimbursed at the pharmacy‟s acquisition cost plus a 35% markup and a $1.00 - $1.25 
dispensing fee.
26  To facilitate California pharmacy buy in, Pennebaker and Boisseree 
decided to maintain or very slightly increase the total pharmacy reimbursement, but 
change the methodology so that the dispensing fee would be $3.25.  The $2.00 - $2.25 
increase from $1.00 - $1.25 in the dispensing fee component corresponded with 35% of 
an actual pharmacy acquisition cost per prescription ranging between $5.71 and $6.43, 
which he thought was in the reasonable range of average pharmacy acquisition costs.  
Though he and Boisseree never explicitly defined AWP, Pennebaker named this “rough 
average” of actual pharmacy acquisition costs Average Wholesale Price, writing those 
words, in their first known usage, on his yellow paper pad. 
As they traveled across California visiting pharmacies to explain the MediCal 
reimbursement policy of AWP plus $3.25 dispensing fee, they were met with mixed 
reactions, although particularly sympathetic support emerged because of its conceptual 
and administrative simplicity. The major problem with implementing it was that at the 
time there was no list of AWPs for commonly dispensed prescription drugs, as AWP was 
not a term that was then being used in pharmaceutical transactions.   
During the 1960s and 1970s and to some extent still today, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers differed in the extent to which they sold directly to pharmacies and other 
providers vs. indirectly via wholesalers and chain warehouses.  When selling directly to 
providers, manufacturers also varied in the extent to which they provided information 
publicly on what prices manufacturers suggested retail pharmacies charge consumers.    
Drug Topics Red Book was one of several directory or catalog publications summarizing 
various drug prices; these catalogs served as a resource for pharmacists.  Annual Red Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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Book catalog prices (supplemented twice yearly in January and May) provided 
information on “suggested selling price to consumer” and “cost price to the retail 
druggist”
27 at various drug strengths and package sizes.  Prices paid by the retail druggist 
to acquire drugs were named “Trade List Prices”, and were separately identified as to 
whether the price referred to prices paid by the retailer on direct orders from the 
manufacturer, or by the retailer to the wholesaler.  
Pennebaker‟s wish for someone authoritatively to publish figures corresponding 
to his notion of AWPs was soon fulfilled with the September 1969 publication of the 
1970 annual edition of Drug Topics Red Book.  The cover page of this Red Book 
highlighted a new product feature: “The only price directory in the drug field that shows 
Average Wholesale Prices and keeps up-to-date with supplements.”
28  Inside on the 
Product Information page, the 1970 Red Book explained (with some imprecision): 
The price paid by the retailer to the wholesaler is either that suggested by the  
manufacturer or an independently determined Average Wholesale Price which is 
preceded by the symbol “(AWP)”.  For the first time in the drug field the 1970 
Drug Topics Red Book has procured and reports these Average Wholesale Prices 
for those drug products where the manufacturer has not suggested a price to be 
charged by wholesalers to indirect purchasing retailers.  It has been independently 
obtained and calculated by the Red Book’s editorial staff from a representative 
group of wholesalers located in different areas throughout the country…There has 
been a long felt need for this type of price information and Drug Topics Red Book 
has gone to considerable effort to compile a meaningful price for its subscribers.  
It is hoped that the Average Wholesale Price may be used as a guide by 
wholesalers and retailers and the government agencies.  Although this price is 
designed to show the average price retailers throughout the country are paying to 
the wholesaler for a particular item, it is not intended to be a standard or 
established price.
29 
 
The 1970 Red Book continued to distinguish a manufacturer‟s price charged to direct 
customers from prices retailers paid to wholesalers, but beginning in 1970 added AWP 
figures, calling all of them “trade list prices”.  Subsequent annual issues of the Red Book 
continued publication of the AWP, clearly designating it as a list price.
30      
Within months, a competitive price catalog publication, the American Druggist 
Blue Book 1970, also began publishing AWP, referring to it as a “trade list price” through 
1975.  In 1976, however, the Blue Book did away with the “trade list price” column 
heading and instead simply separately listed a new “Average Wholesale Price” and Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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“Direct Net Price”, stating in a footnote that the former was “Based on latest Blue Book 
surveys.”  The Blue Book also added a new “Suggested Wholesale Price.”
31  The 1977 
April update replaced the previous years‟ footnote to Average Wholesale Price with an 
elongated dagger symbol referring to “Manufacturer‟s Estimated AWP” prices.
32  A 1994 
publication stated “BLUE BOOK AWP is either the published suggested wholesale price 
obtained from the manufacturer/labeler or the price commonly charged by wholesalers as 
determined by survey.”
33  Notably, George Pennebaker apparently never asked Red Book 
or Blue Book how they in fact obtained their estimates of AWP, stating simply that he 
thought the published AWP figures “looked reasonable”.
34 
         D.2  Relationships Between Branded AWP and Branded WAC 
Having discussed the creation and early evolution of the AWP notional price, we 
now turn to why it was that for most branded drugs in the 1970s and 1980s (and in many 
cases continuing on to this day), AWP tends to be 20% or 25% greater than WAC, 
implying that WAC is usually 16.7% or 20% smaller than AWP.  The source of this 
relatively stable relationship for brands has been identified by Kolassa [1994]: 
The AWP, the most common figure used for drug price comparisons, is a vestige  
of a drug distribution system that disappeared in the early 1980s.  Prior to that 
time, there were several hundred small, independent drug wholesalers, each 
operating regionally.  Due to the inefficiencies of such a fragmented system, the 
operating costs were quite high.  The average markup above cost by these 
wholesalers to their retail customers, primarily pharmacies, was 20% to 25%, 
depending on manufacturer.  The manufacturer differences were due to the fact 
that, while most pharmaceutical manufacturers used a wholesaler-only method of 
distribution to the retail class of trade, a significant number of large firms had 
invested in their own distribution networks and preferred „direct‟ sales over the 
use of wholesalers.  By convention, wholesalers added 20% to the price of 
products from companies following a wholesaler-only policy while adding 25% to 
the prices of products from those companies who chose to „compete‟ with the 
wholesalers.  At that time, virtually all pharmaceutical companies sold products 
directly to hospitals that did not use wholesalers.  As a result, less than one-half of 
the pharmaceutical products sold in the United States were handled by drug 
wholesalers in the early 1970s.
35 
 
While Kolassa‟s observations help explain sources of the 20% or 25% wholesaler 
markups to retailers, there is ample evidence that since the 1980s these wholesaler 
markups have declined substantially, with pharmacies acquiring branded drugs at 
discounts that approach 20% off of AWP, consistent with WAC plus a few percentage Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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points.  This raises at least two issues:  Why did the decline in wholesaler markups to 
retailers occur, and in the face of this trend, why has the ratio of AWP to WAC remained 
relatively stable for branded drugs?  We first examine published trends in pharmacies‟ 
ability to purchase branded prescription drugs at increasing discounts off AWP over time. 
                     D.3   The Declining Markups of Drug Wholesaler Sales to Retailers 
  Already in the late 1960s, evidence was accumulating that drug wholesaler 
margins were declining.  Based on published data from the National Wholesale 
Druggists‟ Association, Keller [1969] reports that wholesalers‟ gross margins had fallen 
from 18% in 1950 to 15.3% of net sales in 1966, even as net profit before taxes fell from 
4.1% to 2.9% of net sales; most of that margin decline occurred in the 1960s.  The 
decline in drug wholesaler gross margins continued, however, falling to 14.4% in 1970 
and then accelerated in the 1970s to 11.9% in 1977, the last year for which data are 
reported.
36 
  The sustained decline in wholesaler gross margins reflects several offsetting 
trends.  Fay [1980] documents the gradual increase over time in operating expenses until 
about the early 1960s, peaking at 14.0% of sales in 1961, then gradually declining to 
12.3% in 1970, and falling more sharply in the 1970s, to 10.2% in 1977, the last year for 
which he reports data .
37  Part of the reason was the increasing cost during the 1950s of 
servicing geographically diffused pharmacies with an ever wider array of over-the-
counter and prescription-only products.  Beginning in the 1960s, however, the diffusion 
of information and communications technologies and the rationalization of product 
distribution logistics reduced operating costs.  Throughout the 1957-77 time period, 
however, wholesaler discounts granted to pharmacy clients steadily increased – from 
2.4% of net sales in 1957, 3.0% in 1963, 4.6% in 1967, 5.3% in 1970 and 6.5% in 1977.
38  
Fay [1980, p. 37] quotes from the 1976 National Wholesale Druggists Association annual 
report, which stated “Almost every dollar gained in the operations area has been in turn 
dissipated through increased discounts.”   
  The increasing cost phenomenon during the 1950s actually favored large 
wholesalers over brand manufacturers, for branded drug manufacturers had much less 
scale and scope than did the large wholesalers, and as a result likely experienced even 
greater increasing costs in maintaining direct distribution to retailers.  The increasing Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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costs of maintaining distribution networks with pharmacies not only created incentives 
for brand manufacturers to shed direct distribution with multiple regional warehouses and 
change to indirect sales networks via wholesalers with increasingly rationalized 
warehousing, but it also created incentives for consolidation among the wholesalers.
39  
Consolidation during the 1960s and 1970s was likely driven in large part by 
computerization and the associated exploitation by wholesalers of economies of scale and 
scope.  F.D.C. Reports [1966], publisher of a general pharmaceutical industry trade 
publication called The Pink Sheet, observed that a likely very powerful force changing 
the dynamics of wholesaling was the advent of electronic processing equipment that 
enabled wholesalers to improve the efficiency of their operations, exploit prospects for 
tying customers to a single wholesaler by offering to maintain continuing inventory 
records, provide pharmacies with software, and assist them in the installation of data 
phones tied to electronic equipment.   Fay [1980, p. 42], cites in particular the role of 
automation of order entry processing: 
  “…the automation of the order entry process between retailer and wholesaler is  
clearly most important since it leads to all of the efficiencies and cost reduction 
inherent in the single source concept – a retailer concentrating nearly all of his 
orders with one supplier.”
40 
 
  A related phenomenon affecting wholesale druggists was the emerging invasion 
of the retail trade more generally – not just the retail drug trade – by mass merchandisers 
and food chains.  Recall that during the 1970s, following the pioneering practices of Sam 
Walton‟s WalMart and other “superbox” retailers, widespread implementation of 
information and communications technological developments significantly impacted the 
rationalization of wholesaler-retailer or distribution center-retailer logistics, giving rise to 
new networks of automated distribution centers and “just in time” inventory 
management.  Along with the increasing ability to monitor transactions in real time, 
thereby more efficiently managing inventory and product shipping, these developments 
exploited economies of both scale and scope, and in the process led to the demise of 
many small retail and wholesale firms.  Kolassa [1994, pp. 236-7] describes how 
consolidating pharmaceutical wholesalers adopted more sophisticated inventory control 
systems and expanded software and communications hardware services to their client 
retail pharmacies and hospitals.  Fay [1983] provides additional details on how computer Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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and information technology developments affected wholesaler-retail interactions in the 
pharmaceutical industry.
41 
With increasing consolidation among wholesalers, competition from mass 
merchandisers and food chains, and inexorable technological developments that 
facilitated exploitation of economies of scale and scope, thereby reducing product 
distribution and transaction monitoring costs, one would expect that prices charged 
retailers by wholesalers would have reflected increasing discounts off AWP.  Note that if 
there is a relatively stable relationship of brand AWP list prices being 20% or 25% 
greater than brand WAC list prices, the actual discounts off AWP granted by wholesalers 
to retailers have an upper limit of about 20%; to the extent generic products have larger 
discrepancies between AWP and WAC, the average discount could be even greater.  In 
fact, increasingly large discounts off AWP have been documented in a number of studies, 
both for brand and generic purchases by retailers from wholesalers.    
Over the years, the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) at the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services has conducted and publicly disclosed results of a number of 
investigations comparing Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates with commercial 
pharmacies‟ and providers‟ acquisition costs. For example, using 1994 invoice data 
sampled from Medicaid pharmacy providers in 11 states, the OIG found that pharmacies 
on average acquired branded drugs from wholesalers at an 18.3% discount off AWP.
42  
Using 1995 data, a year when Medicare Part B physicians and suppliers were being 
reimbursed for branded and generic drugs at AWP - 5%, another OIG study concluded 
that for 22 drug codes representing Medicare‟s largest Part B dollar outlays, the average 
discount over both brand and generic drugs was 29%.
43  A 2001 OIG study using 1997 
Medicaid data from pharmacy invoices in eight states found that for these states, the 
average pharmacy acquisition cost for brands involved a 21.8% discount off AWP, an 
increase from the 19.3% observed in these states using 1994 data.   OIG also compared 
WAC to actual acquisition prices for pharmacies, and determined that invoice prices 
were, on an average national basis, 1.8% below WAC.
44  Discounts off AWP list prices 
for generics were much larger, increasing on average from 55% off list using 1994 data to 
65.9% based on 1997 invoice transactions.
45  Moreover, discounts off AWP were not 
confined to major government programs such as Medicare Part B and Medicaid, but also Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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occurred in the private sector.  For example, referring to a 1993 report issued by the 
General Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) in 1996 noted that 
private payers also received large discounts off AWP, stating “A recent General 
Accounting Office (GAO) survey found that four HMOs received an average discount off 
the published list price of 32 percent in 1990 and 34 percent in 1991 on their top 100 
outpatient drugs.”
46 
Given that Medicare and Medicaid drug reimbursement rates to pharmacies used 
discounts off AWP that were much less than pharmacies were actually receiving, the 
declines in markups attained by wholesalers translated into increasing ingredient cost 
margins for pharmacies, particularly for generic drugs.  In a 2004 CBO study that defined 
pharmacy markups as “the dollar difference between the total amount that Medicaid pays 
the pharmacy for each prescription and the amount that the pharmacy or wholesaler pays 
the manufacturer for the drug”
47, the authors concluded that “Between 1997 and 2002, by 
CBO‟s estimates, the average markup increased by nearly 60 percent – rising from $8.70 
to $13.80 per prescription, or by about 9.7% per year.”  CBO went on further, noting that: 
Much of the increase in the average markup was attributable to the use of 
relatively new generic drugs.  For generic drugs that came on the market between 
1997 and 2002, Medicaid reimbursed pharmacies an average of about $46 per 
prescription in 2002, of which only about $14 went for the purchase of the drug 
itself.  Pharmacies and wholesalers retained the remainder, or markup, of about 
$32 per prescription.”
48   
 
  In summary, the combination of wholesaler consolidation and their exploitation of 
economies of scale and scope, facilitated by technological progress embodied in ever 
lower cost computers and information technology software and equipment, resulted in 
wholesaler markups and margins diminishing considerably over time, as actual pharmacy 
acquisition costs were increasingly discounted off the AWP list price.   
  The final issue we address in this lengthy digression on AWP pricing is why is it 
that branded manufacturers did not bring actual pharmacy acquisition costs closer to 
published AWPs.  In other words, why have AWPs adhered to the 20% or 25% formulaic 
markup over WAC? 
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           D.4    Factors Locking in Branded Drugs’ AWP to WAC Relationships 
  As the Drug Topics Red Book data description quoted above made clear, not all 
brand manufacturers provided data on the AWP of their drugs; others instead provided 
some form of alternative “suggested price.”  In addition to surveying wholesalers and 
thereby generating their own estimates of AWP for data non-supplying manufacturers, 
price catalogs such as the Red Book and the Blue Book were able to generate AWPs for 
manufacturers who previously had but no longer provided such data by examining 
whether historically the manufacturer had a 20% or 25% markup over WAC for its AWP 
or other “suggested price”, and continued to use that markup factor in generating their 
AWP.   
Given the virtual universal presence of an AWP for drug products, whether 
supplied by the manufacturer or estimated by the price catalogs, transaction prices 
involving wholesalers, PBMs, pharmacies and other providers could all be specified with 
reference to AWP minus some x% discount.   For example, a pharmacy could acquire all 
its brand drugs from the wholesaler at AWP – 18%, could be reimbursed by PBMs for 
dispensing any of its brand drugs at AWP – 13%, even as PBMs contracted with third 
party payers for all their brand drug costs at AWP – 10%.  In this example, pharmacies‟ 
gross margin would be 5% of AWP for all its brand drug sales, while the common margin 
for PBMs would be 3% of AWP.   
The important point is that even though few if any transactions actually took place 
at the AWP price, the notional AWP served a valuable role as a common focal or 
reference point from which various discounts could be negotiated.  While in theory 
pharmacies, PBMs and payers could negotiate separate AWP discounts that varied by 
manufacturer or drug, this would make electronic transactions more complicated and 
vulnerable to error.  Rather, it was much simpler and more efficient for various contracts 
among PBMs, pharmacies and payers to specify the same percent off AWP for all 
branded drugs, regardless of manufacturer.  Given AWP data entry into the networked 
computer system, very large numbers of various transactions among manufacturers, 
wholesalers, chain warehouses, retail and mail order pharmacies, other providers, PBMs 
and private and governmental payers could be processed and finalized expeditiously, 
efficiently and monitored very accurately.  Hence, even though some observers Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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accurately called AWP “Ain‟t What‟s Paid,” AWP played a critical role in facilitating 
efficiently millions if not billions of transactions among the various manufacturers, 
providers, and payers
49.     
As wholesalers over time increasingly discounted off AWP in their sales to 
pharmacies and other providers, the “spread” between AWP and providers‟ actual 
acquisition costs increased.  For some providers, such as physicians providing Medicare 
Part B drug benefits (e.g., chemotherapy, other injected and infused therapies), the spread 
between AWP and the provider‟s actual acquisition costs became an increasingly 
significant source of practice revenues.  In the 1980s, for example, Medicare reimbursed 
these providers at full AWP, and in the early 1990s, at AWP – 5%.   Any single 
manufacturer attempting to bring its AWP more in line with medical practice actual 
acquisition costs by unilaterally reducing its AWP and then discounting it less 
aggressively than its competitors would have been competitively disadvantaged, for as 
discussed above both Medicare and private contracts uniformly specified a common 
discount off AWP for all manufacturers.   
To see this, consider the following.  In the above Medicare Part B example, if in 
the 1990s a manufacturer decided unilaterally not to discount off AWP, all providers 
being reimbursed by Medicare Part B at AWP – 5% would lose 5% of AWP with every 
purchase; as AWP increased over time, the absolute amount of dollar losses incurred by 
the provider would increase.  Each manufacturer unilaterally considering reducing AWP 
discounts to bring AWP closer to actual acquisition costs faced the same disincentive.  In 
the language of economics and game theory, staying with the notional and in some sense 
“unrealistic” AWP system was a Nash equilibrium; it was competitively optimal for each 
manufacturer to adhere to the traditional WAC-to-AWP markup, given what other 
manufacturers (and the system of contracts) were doing.  In short, individual 
manufacturers were locked into the AWP system, even if they wanted to change it. 
An alternative possibility among brand manufacturers would involve their 
agreeing in a coordinated manner simultaneously to reduce their AWP so that it would be 
much closer to actual provider acquisition costs.  In order to ensure that relative new 
AWPs would be preserved across manufacturers from relative old AWPs, thereby 
mitigating problems of gaming, the brand manufacturers would need also to agree to Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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reduce their new AWPs by a common percentage from their old AWPs.  Moving AWPs 
to more closely approximate providers‟ actual acquisition costs would have required 
coordination.   
One problem with such a coordinated mutual reduction in manufacturers‟ AWPs 
is that such actions would likely invite antitrust scrutiny and challenge from the U.S. 
Department of Justice.  Notably, such antitrust concerns apparently occurred in the early 
1990s when pharmaceutical manufacturers considered and then rejected the idea of 
mutually pledging to keep brand name drug prices from rising more rapidly than the 
Consumer Price Index, a proposal that the then Assistant U.S. Attorney General Anne 
Bingaman indicated  
“…would violate the antitrust laws.  An agreement among independent 
competitors that interferes with free and open price competition by restraining 
individual pricing decisions is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.  The per se 
rule has been applied to agreements among competitors that fix or set the prices at 
which goods or services are sold as well as agreements that set price-related terms 
but not the specific price at which transactions occur.”
50 
 
Hence, such coordination among manufacturers attempting mutually to bring their AWPs 
more in line with providers‟ actual acquisition costs was infeasible since it was illegal. 
Yet another possibility would be that major public sector purchasers, such as the 
Health Care Financing Administration (later renamed the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, “CMS”) and the Veterans‟ Administration could require that 
information on actual acquisition and/or manufacturers‟ net revenues be made public, or 
at least be disclosed on a confidential basis to major public (and possibly private) sector 
payers.  In fact, several variants of that possibility have emerged from legislation.   
Specifically, when Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990 (“OBRA 90”), it specified that the Medicaid programs receive a rebate that was the 
lower of a “best price” to a private purchaser, or 15.1% off the Average Manufacturer‟s 
Price (“AMP”) for each drug, plus an allowance for inflation over and above that of the 
CPI.  AMP was defined in federal law as the average price (including cash discounts and 
other price reductions) paid to drug manufacturers by U.S. wholesalers for drugs 
distributed to the retail class of trade.  Retail here included mail order operations 
dispensing to patients.  In turn, “best price” was defined in federal law as the lowest price Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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(including cash discounts and other price reductions) available from the manufacturer to 
any U.S. wholesaler, retailer, provider, health maintenance organization, nonprofit entity, 
or government entity, with some exceptions.  In order to participate in Medicaid, 
manufacturers must report both AMPs and best prices.  While CMS could audit 
manufacturers to ensure the accuracy of the manufacturer‟s AMP and best price 
computations, the law required that CMS maintain the confidentiality of this AMP 
information, which therefore was not publicly available.
51 
In part because the various states‟ Medicaid agencies were continuing to 
reimburse pharmacies at considerably smaller discounts off AWP than private payers 
were paying pharmacies, enabling pharmacies to retain the spread between their 
discounted AWP reimbursement and actual acquisition costs, in 2005 the Bipartisan 
Commission on Medicaid Reform recommended a change from AWP list prices to AMP 
actual prices, stating: 
“There is widespread acceptance that AWP is inflated and does not reflect a valid  
benchmark for pricing.  A different reference price should be established and 
made available to the states that more accurately reflects the actual price for 
drugs.  The Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) should be used for this 
purpose.”
52 
 
For multiple source (generic) drugs dispensed to Medicaid recipients, the 
maximum amount a state Medicaid agency can reimburse a pharmacy is called the 
Federal Upper Limit (“FUL”).
53  Over the years the FUL has been computed based on a 
somewhat complex procedure involving AWPs of generic drugs.  States can choose to 
establish reimbursement limits below the FUL at a state maximum allowable cost 
(“MAC”).  State-specific programs also establish dispensing fee and patient copayment 
policies, which have varied considerably among the states.  As a general rule, the state-
specific lists typically include more drugs, list newly available generic drugs more 
quickly, and establish more aggressive (i.e., lower) reimbursements than does the FUL 
list.  Private payers also create their own MACs, whose construction details are typically 
proprietary.
54 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (“DRA”) mandated that CMS change the way 
in which FUL was determined for multiple source drugs using the formula AMP times 
250%.  AMP data was also to be published on the Internet.  Final Rules for implementing Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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the AMP provisions were issued by CMS in July 2007.  However, the National 
Association of Chain Drug Stores (“NACDS”) and the National Community Pharmacy 
Association (“NCPA”) successfully filed suit against CMS and in December 2007 won 
an injunction from U.S. District Court Judge Royce Lamberth that prevented CMS from 
adopting the AMP-based FUL determination and publishing AMP data on the Internet.
55   
The March 2010 health care reform legislation redefined AMP.  Effective October 
1, 2010, AMP is limited to sales to retail community pharmacies and wholesalers selling 
to these pharmacies (including independent, chain and supermarket pharmacies), but 
explicitly excluding mail order pharmacies, hospital pharmacies, and not-for-profit 
pharmacies.  Since the excluded pharmacies have in the past been able to obtain 
substantially larger discounts than community pharmacies, the resulting AMP is larger 
than would be the case were these pharmacy transactions not excluded.
56  Rather than 
publishing prices at the individual manufacturer level for each drug, CMS is now 
required to post only the weighted average of the AMPs over multiple-source drugs, 
implying that pricing data for individual products will continue to remain confidential.  
The FUL applicable to each group of multiple source drugs is set at 175% of their 
weighted AMP.  Ostensibly to mitigate significant quarter to quarter fluctuations, CMS is 
to apply a smoothing process.   Notably the 2010 health care reform legislation also 
increased the Medicaid rebate for branded drugs from 15.1% to 23.1%.
57      
Turning from Medicaid to Medicare, under provisions of the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”), beginning 
January 1, 2005 Medicare Part B reimbursement for single-source (primarily on-patent 
originator brand drugs) became 106% of their two-quarter lagged average sales price 
(“ASP”) or their WAC, whichever is lower.  The ASP is intended to represent the 
volume-weighted average manufacturer sales price net of rebates and discounts to all 
U.S. purchasers, excluding sales that are exempt from the Medicaid best price 
calculations and those to other federal purchasers.  Rebates and discounts incorporated 
into the ASP calculation include volume discounts, prompt payment discounts, cash 
discounts, free goods that are contingent on any purchase requirement, chargebacks, and 
rebates to providers (not payers) other than those paid under the Medicaid rebate 
program.  For new drugs and biologicals approved by the FDA, for the first two quarters Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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for which it is sold, the ASP is computed as 106% of WAC, or invoice pricing if the 
WAC is not published.  Beginning in the third calendar quarter of its first year of  U.S. 
sales, however, the ASP represents the average sales price lagged two quarters.  Unlike 
AMP, however, ASP is posted by CMS on its website, and thus is publicly available.
58  
Yet another federal government purchase price is that on the Federal Supply 
Schedule (“FSS”) for pharmaceuticals, administered by the Veteran‟s Administration 
(“VA”).  It is a list of products and their prices available to federal entities that purchase 
prescription drugs.  In order to have their products covered and paid for by Medicaid 
programs, under terms of OBRA 1990 and Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, 
manufacturers must agree to supply drugs at these prices.  The FSS price is intended to 
equal or better the price that the manufacturer offers its most-favored nonfederal 
customer under comparable terms and conditions.  Similar to the best price, to determine 
the Federal Ceiling Price (more on this below), manufacturers must provide the VA 
information on price discounts and rebates offered to domestic customers and the terms 
and conditions involved.  The FSS price is publicly available.
59  The VA‟s Office of 
Inspector General reviews the information used to determine the FSS price.  Agencies 
using the FSS generally provide drugs directly to beneficiaries through their own 
pharmacies and facilities.
60  A related price is the Federal Ceiling Price (“FCP”) which is 
the maximum price manufacturers can charge for FSS-listed brand name drugs to the VA, 
Department of Defense, Public Health Service and the Coast Guard – even if the FSS 
price is higher.  FCP must be at least 24% below the non-Federal AMP.  Data on FCP 
prices are not publicly available.
61 
In summary, while the misnamed Average Wholesale Price remains and continues 
to play a critical role in providing a reference point for pharmaceutical transactions, for 
brands the discount off AWP has increased over time and likely will reach a peak as 
wholesaler markups over WAC decline to competitive levels.  While manufacturers are 
locked in to the AWP system of pricing, the federal government has taken various steps 
to gain access to information that enables it to acquire or reimburse for branded 
pharmaceuticals at levels equal to or lower than paid by private purchasers. For generics, 
whether the federal government (and state Medicaid agencies) reimburse at levels equal 
to or lower than those paid by private purchasers is unclear, although historically that has Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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not been the case.  Later on in this chapter we discuss other recent related developments 
involving payers‟ attempts to make public pharmacy acquisition costs. 
D.5 The First DataBank - McKesson Settlement:  Is AWP About To Die? 
To this point our discussion of AWP has emphasized that even though AWP is a 
reference price that increasingly diverged from actual pharmacy acquisition costs, 
remarkably it has endured and continued to play a critical role as a benchmark price for 
the multitude of transactions involving various private and public sector participants. 
However, developments of the last decade have led some industry observers to declare 
that the death of AWP, while not imminent, is inevitable.   
On October 6, 2006, the Wall Street Journal published a front page article by 
Barbara Martinez reporting that First DataBank (“FDB”), the unit of Hearst Corporation 
publishing the Blue Book, in late 2001 had decided to increase the AWP to WAC markup 
from 1.20 to 1.25 for over 400 hundred drugs, in a secret agreement with drug wholesaler 
McKesson.
62  Third party payers and groups representing the uninsured sued FDB and 
McKesson.  The Federal District Court Judge presiding over the ensuing litigation, Judge 
Patti B. Saris, described the FDB – McKesson conspiracy as follows: 
“Typically, a drug‟s wholesale acquisition cost or „WAC‟ was understood as the  
price wholesalers paid to purchase a drug from the manufacturer; the WAC was 
then marked up by a fixed percent to derive the AWP.   FDB represented that it 
surveyed wholesalers to ascertain the AWP, but this was untrue.  Beginning in 
2001, FDB and McKesson reached a secret agreement to raise the markup 
between WAC and AWP from its standard 20% to 25% for over four hundred 
drugs.  McKesson communicated these new 25% WAC to AWP markups to FDB, 
which then published AWPs with the new markup.  To camouflage the scheme, 
McKesson and FDB agreed to effectuate price changes only when some other 
WAC-based price announcement was made by a drug manufacturer. McKesson 
has estimated that by 2002, 95% of all prescription drug manufacturers used the 
inflated 25% markup, and by 2004, 99% of all prescription drug manufacturers 
did so.  The scheme ended on March 15, 2005, when FDB told its customers that 
it would „no longer survey drug wholesalers for information relating to AWP‟.  
The scheme resulted in higher profits for retail pharmacies that purchase drugs on 
the basis of WAC but are reimbursed on the basis of AWP, a differential called 
the „spread‟.  McKesson implemented the scheme in order to provide a greater 
„spread‟ to important retail pharmacy clients like Rite Aid as well as to its only 
pharmacy related businesses.”
63 
 
Any other stakeholder whose revenues (costs) depended on the spread, also profited (was 
adversely affected).  Apparently both insurers (such as United Health) and manufacturers Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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contacted FDB asking for explanations of the AWP increase, but were unable to obtain a 
satisfactory explanation.
64  
In a January 2005 deposition, Kay Morgan, who had been in charge of AWPs at 
FDB, testified that rather than FDB relying on surveys from various wholesalers, since 
late 2003 the only wholesaler providing FDB with markup information was McKesson.
65    
  Without admitting to any wrongdoing, eventually both FDB and McKesson 
settled, although FDB‟s initial 2006 and 2008 proposed settlements with plaintiffs were 
opposed by pharmacies and some PBMs;
66 McKesson agreed to a settlement in 
November 2008 just before the scheduled beginning of a trial.  A final FDB settlement 
was not approved by the Court until March 2009.  This final settlement was challenged 
by several organizations representing pharmacies, and an organization representing 
PBMs, but was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on 
September 3, 2009.  Under terms of the settlements, McKesson agreed to pay $350 
million, and set aside a $143 million reserve for certain future claims.
67  FDB issued a 
statement saying not only had it agreed to roll back the prices of approximately 1400 
drugs identified in the plaintiffs‟ previously filed complaint to a Blue Book AWP of 1.20 
times the WAC or Direct Price effective September 26, 2009, but that independent of the 
settlement, by the same date, FDB would apply the identical 1.20 markup factor to all 
other drugs  
“…whose Blue Book AWP is set based upon a markup to WAC or Direct Price in 
excess of 1.20.  First DataBank will also independently discontinue publishing the 
Blue Book AWP data field for all drugs no later than two years following the date 
that the Blue Book AWP adjustments noted above are implemented.”
68     
 
FDB stated that it would, however, continue to publish other drug pricing information 
such as WAC, Direct Price, Suggested Wholesale Price, and Federal Upper Limits.  
  Interestingly, a year earlier, on January 23, 2008, Judge Saris issued an order 
denying approval of a previously proposed settlement which would have required that 
First DataBank cease publishing AWP within two years after the Court‟s approval of the 
settlement, as long as no competitor continued publishing similar AWP data.  Since AWP 
is so widely used by the various stakeholders involved in pharmaceutical transactions, the 
Court was concerned that the original settlement had the potential to affect many 
providers that were not parties in the lawsuit.
69  What would be the consequences of this Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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settlement for pharmacies and PBMs (not parties in the law suit), and would this create 
havoc in the entire pharmaceutical reimbursement system, undermining AWP?  Who 
would be the winners and losers from this rollback, and would AWP itself survive as a 
benchmark price from which various discounts were negotiated?   
  In an affidavit an expert economist hired by plaintiffs estimated that the 
settlement would represent a reduction in costs of $4.2 billion annually, of which $3.8 
billion was the impact on third party payers and pharmacies, and $400 million on the 
uninsured.  Plaintiffs worried that pharmacies would be seriously harmed by the rollback, 
unless public and private contract provisions were adjusted to offset the lower 
reimbursement.
70  A spokesman for the National Community Pharmacists Association 
stated that the settlement “will force many mom-and-pops out of business or make drastic 
service reductions, which would hurt consumers, especially in under-served low income 
or rural areas where chains are few”.
71  Benefits consulting firms were less alarmed, 
arguing that the pharmacy supply chain had already absorbed the AWP increases through 
a steady increase in the AWP discounts offered to payers and distributors, and expected 
that PBMs would approach their clients either to request or mandate that currently 
contracted discount guarantees be adjusted downward to make up for the rollback.  Over 
the longer term, however, they voiced concerns that “FDB‟s agreement to cease 
publication of the AWP created the very real possibility that AWP would be phased out 
completely as a pricing index.”
72 
  As the September 26, 2009 AWP-to-WAC markup rollback date approached, 
observers predicted it would have little effect, since PBMs and others “adjusted their 
contracts so that PBMs, their clients and pharmacies will feel little or no financial pain.”  
PBMs described the rollback as “little more than an administrative headache”, saying that 
they and their clients had devised revenue neutral arrangements.  Adam Fein, President of 
Pembroke Consulting, was quoted as saying “My view is that there‟s not going to be 
much of a difference after Sept. 26…As I see it, the net impact on total U.S. drug 
spending will be relatively small and certainly far below the initial multibillion-dollar 
predictions from a few years ago.”  However, one set of “winners” from the rollback 
were state Medicaid agencies, which for the most part had not renegotiated contracts with Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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pharmacies, and thus ended up paying pharmacies less, which by one estimated totaled 
$550 million in just one year.
73 
  While some observers suggested that WAC should eventually replace AWP as the 
benchmark price, others have noted that for brands the relationship between WAC and 
AWP is very stable, and since WAC is a list rather than transactions price, “Judge Saris‟ 
critique of AWP could potentially be leveled against WAC, too.”
74  A 2010 collaboration 
among state Medicaid Directors resulted in the publication of a list of desired 
characteristics of a replacement for AWP, but was unable to reach a consensus regarding 
details.
75  On June 21, 2010, Wolters Kluwer Health, publisher of MediSpan which had 
previously acquired the Red Book pricing compendium, announced that it was 
temporarily reversing its May 2007 decision to discontinue publication of AWP by late 
2011, since “no comprehensive alternative benchmark price is yet available.”  In their 
pricing policy update press release, they stated: 
  “As a result, Wolters Kluwer Health intends to publish AWP (or a similarly  
determined benchmark price) until relevant industry or governmental 
organizations develop a viable, generally accepted alternative price benchmark to 
replace AWP.  Wolters Kluwer Health expects to continue to support industry 
efforts to identify a widely accepted, alternative benchmark and, once such a 
viable AWP alternative exists, to work with customers to migrate the publication 
of that new price benchmark in place of AWP, under an appropriate 
implementation and transition schedule.”
76   
   
  We return to the issue of how reimbursement models based on actual pricing data 
might ultimately become the dominant benchmark for pharmacy reimbursement later in 
this chapter, but now move on to a different aspect of pricing, namely, price 
discrimination.  
E.    Price Discrimination in Prescription Pharmaceuticals 
In the previous pages we have spent considerable time discussing the various 
prices at which a multitude of transactions occur at differing points in the pharmaceutical 
distribution chain, and the roles of discounts, chargebacks and rebates.  But even at the 
same point in the distribution chain, it is not uncommon for differing buyers to pay 
distinct prices for the identical drug; the practice of charging different prices for the 
identical product to distinct buyers is called price discrimination.
77  Economic theory 
suggests that for a firm to find the practice of price discrimination to be profitable and Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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sustainable, three factors must generally be present:  (i) buyers must have heterogeneous 
marginal evaluations; (ii) firms must have market power; and (iii) arbitrage must be 
minimal, because it is costly and/or illegal. 
Regarding buyers‟ heterogeneous evaluations, a great deal of variability exists in 
the valuations patients place on drugs.  Patients vary in their medical and functional 
responsiveness to a medication, and in the values they attach to different characteristics 
and effects of a drug (e.g., its side effect profile, dosing convenience, ability to keep 
functioning while at work or carry out activities of daily living when retired, or about a 
particular drug interaction).  In considering a drug relative to other drug and non-drug 
therapies, the costs of physician office visits (including time and convenience aspects) 
and hospitalizations are also relevant.
78  There is likely also substantial diversity in 
patients‟ willingness to pay for and/or exert efforts to attain or maintain certain health 
states.  On the demand side, therefore, it is reasonable to expect that there is enormous 
heterogeneity in the marginal valuations of medications.  This patient heterogeneity is a 
necessary condition for manufacturers to be able to practice price discrimination. 
Second, firms must have market power.  If a firm attempted to practice price 
discrimination in a perfectly competitive environment, it would either capture the entire 
market by pricing below marginal cost or find itself with excess inventory because buyers 
were purchasing from other sellers offering the product at lower cost.  In the case of 
pharmaceuticals, firms can possess market power by virtue of their having a valid patent 
on the product, by the FDA granting the firm market exclusivity on that product for some 
other reasons (e.g., data exclusivity, pediatric extension, Orphan Drug status), or because 
of some other barriers to entry (e.g., manufacturing know-how, access to rare or limited 
raw materials).  Possession of market power is yet another necessary condition for 
manufacturers to be able to practice price discrimination on a sustained basis. 
Third, arbitrage must minimal, because it is costly and/or illegal.  If arbitrage 
were perfectly legal and costless, purchasers could buy at low cost from the manufacturer 
and resell to others willing to pay a higher price, thereby undoing and subverting the 
manufacturer‟s attempted non-uniform pricing.  For example, if a hospital were able to 
purchase a drug at a highly discounted price for inpatient use, it might wish to operate a 
retail pharmacy open to the public at which it could charge a much higher price.  Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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In the U.S., the potential for arbitraging transactions is very limited, because of 
legislation making many such transactions illegal.  The Prescription Drug Marketing Act 
of 1987, which became effective on July 21, 1988, was intended to reduce public health 
risks from adulterated, misbranded and counterfeit drug products that enter the 
marketplace through drug diversion.
79  The law provides that prescription drugs 
manufactured in the U.S. and exported can no longer be reimported, except by the 
product‟s manufacturer.  It also places restrictions on sales of prescription drugs and 
samples.   Hospitals cannot sell prescription drugs to the general public.
80  Wholesale 
distributors must be licensed by the state and meet uniform standards.  The practice of 
wholesalers reselling to each other, particularly drugs whose shelf life is about to expire, 
continues to be a focus of FDA regulatory attention.   
Over the years since 1987, there has also been considerable Congressional 
attention and legislation regarding the reimportation of drugs for personal use, 
particularly from Canada.  Currently implementation of such reimportation is under the 
discretionary authority of the FDA.
81    
For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that along with heterogeneity of 
consumers‟ evaluations and the presence of manufacturer market power, arbitrage of 
prescription drugs in the U.S. is costly and in many cases illegal, and is insufficient to 
discourage the practice of price discrimination.  Together these three conditions make 
sustained price discrimination of prescription drugs feasible.
82 
   One other factor, this on the cost rather than demand side, makes price 
discrimination of prescription pharmaceuticals very attractive, and that is the high 
fixed/sunk cost, low marginal cost structure.  A number of studies have estimated the 
costs of bringing a prescription pharmaceutical to market;
83 also see the chapters in this 
volume by DiMasi, “Costs and Returns to R&D”, and by Metrick and Nicholson, 
“Financing R&D”.  The costs include opportunity costs of funds and failed projects.  The 
most recent of these (DiMasi, Hansen and Grabowski [2003]) estimates that around the 
turn of the century, it took on average about $802 million of 2000 dollars and 12 years to 
bring a new drug to market, including prepatent application R&D.  The $802 million is 
more than twice the $350 million estimated a decade earlier, and in large part reflects 
increased costs of clinical development rather than basic R&D.  Estimates in the same Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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general range have been reported by Adams and Van Brantner [2006].  However, while 
there appears to be substantial heterogeneity in development costs across therapeutic 
areas,
84 it appears that on average the costs of bring traditional chemically synthesized 
small molecule pharmaceuticals are about the same as that for large molecule biologics.
85 
  In contrast to the fixed or sunk R&D costs, the variable and marginal costs of 
manufacturing and marketing a prescription pharmaceutical once it has been approved by 
the FDA are often very small, nickels and dimes, not dollars, for many small molecule 
pharmaceuticals; evidence on this is provided by the fact that following loss of patent 
protection and extensive generic entry, prices of generic drugs fall to as low as 10% of 
the brand price.
86  For some drugs, however, particularly large molecule proteins and 
biologics, manufacturing marginal costs can be substantial.  Whether small molecule or 
biologic, therefore, relative to the fixed or sunk R&D costs, marginal production costs are 
much smaller, implying that returns to scale are substantial, and that as long as price 
compensates for marginal production and marketing costs, it will be profitable for the 
manufacturer to price discriminate.
87  Combined with the fact that three necessary 
conditions for price discrimination to be feasible and sustainable are met for 
pharmaceuticals – patient marginal evaluation heterogeneity, manufacturer market power 
and minimal possibilities to arbitrage – the presence of very substantial production scale 
economies implies that branded manufacturers face strong incentives to practice price 
discrimination.  
  Within the U.S., considerable price variability occurs across distribution channels, 
with the VA and Medicaid able to obtain very low brand prices, staff model health 
maintenance organizations slightly higher but still relatively low prices, third party payers 
higher prices depending in large part on their ability to implement tiered formularies, and 
retail pharmacies frequently paying the highest brand prices.
88  These practices gave rise 
to considerable litigation within the U.S. in the 1990s, with some economists arguing that 
since a necessary condition for third degree price discrimination to increase welfare (total 
quantity sold in all markets being greater than if a uniform price occurred across all 
markets
89) likely was satisfied in the case of pharmaceuticals, such price discrimination 
was welfare enhancing within the U.S.
90  Others, however, argued that the practice of 
price discrimination unfairly affected pharmacies, particularly independent pharmacies.
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What is clear and relatively uncontested, however, is that third degree price 
discrimination is a common occurrence in the U.S. branded prescription drug industry. 
  A more enduring and perhaps even more passionate debate involves price 
discrimination across countries.  Although for many years global brand pharmaceutical 
companies charged lower prices to southern European countries than to those in northern 
Europe and Great Britain, in the 1980s arbitrage (known as parallel importing) became 
more prevalent.  The European Union has explicitly permitted parallel importing, and this 
has affected global branded pharmaceutical companies‟ pricing strategies; for discussion, 
see Kyle [2007, 2009, 2010].  Danzon and Towse [2003] argue that the case for third 
degree price discrimination improving global economic welfare is much more 
complicated in the context of fixed and sunk R&D costs than it is for constant cost 
industries, and that instead the Ramsey pricing analysis of second-best pricing provides a 
more appropriate theoretical framework.  Moreover, if (absolute values of ) countries‟ 
price elasticities of demand are positively related to countries‟ income (per capita) levels, 
then not only might there be a strong case for third degree price discrimination on 
economic efficiency criteria, but it could also be consistent with standard norms of 
equity.  Access pricing for pharmaceuticals via third degree price discrimination remains 
a controversial global policy issue.  For further discussion, see the chapters in this volume 
by Patricia Danzon, “Pricing and Reimbursement: Other Countries”, and by Hannah 
Kettler, David Ridley and Adrian Towse, “Drugs for Developing Countries”.   
  Our goal in this introductory section on the economics of pharmaceutical pricing 
has been to provide an institutional background and introduction of various pricing 
concepts for the U.S.  Having reviewed important U.S. legislation, characterized the 
generic industry as approximating a competitive market with price equal to marginal cost, 
outlined various distribution channel transactions along with their prices, discounts, 
chargebacks and rebates, digressed to summarize the creation and evolution of the 
misnamed but ubiquitous average wholesale price, and then discussed why the demand 
and cost conditions facing biopharmaceutical firms provide strong incentives for firms to 
practice intra- and inter-country third degree price discrimination, we now turn to a 
discussion of the economic theory foundations of supply prices for branded drugs.   
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III.   Supply Prices and Brand Name Drugs 
A.  Monopolist Prices With and Without Prescription Drug Insurance   
Relative to most other developed country markets for pharmaceuticals, pricing in 
the U.S. pharmaceutical market more closely resembles pricing in standard (non-drug) 
economic markets (see also the Danzon chapter, “Pricing and Reimbursement: Other 
Countries”).  Applying standard microeconomic tools to analyze these markets is 
therefore reasonably straightforward, although issues concerning asymmetric 
information, moral hazard, patient heterogeneity and physician agency preclude one from 
viewing market demand curves as reflecting the outcome of representative consumers 
maximizing utility subject to budget constraints.  Here we simply assume the existence of 
downward sloping demand curves, but do not attempt to derive them based on consumer 
optimization theory.
92 
  We begin by considering the simple - but in practice unusual - case of an on-
patent drug with no close substitutes that is not covered by health insurance.
93  Viagra 
may be as close to an actual example as we can come.  The elementary textbook model of 
monopoly pricing applies straightforwardly to this case; the profit maximizing price for 
the manufacturer will be at the quantity where marginal revenue and marginal cost are 
equal.   
  Specifically, if the inverse demand equation is linear and of the form  
      p = a – bq, where a, b > 0,                                                      (1) 
p is price, q is quantity, and if total costs are 
      TC = c + dq, where c, d > 0,                                                  (2) 
then the usual profit maximizing behavior yields optimal price p* and quantity q* as 
      p* = (a + d)/2   and   q* = (a-d)/2b.                                       (3) 
Notice that p* does not depend on b, the slope of the demand curve; p* is simply half the 
vertical distance between the constant marginal cost d and the market‟s reservation price 
a.   See Figure 1. 
  As time passes, therapeutic substitutes are likely to come on to the market for the 
drug that had no close substitutes when it was introduced, as has been the case with 
Viagra.  As this happens standard models of differentiated monopoly or monopolistic  
   Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
Page 35 
 
 
 
 
B 
A
C 
C
A 
Marginal cost   
P(i=1) 
P(i=0.2) 
Price 
Quantity 
Figure 1 
The inverse demand curve BC, corresponding to no insurance, has slope 
-b.  The demand curve AC, corresponding to a coinsurance rate of 0.2, 
has slope = -5.  Marginal revenue curves are the dotted lines 
corresponding to the two demand curves.  Price at a coinsurance rate of 
0.2 is not quite five times as great as with no insurance (i=1). 
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competition apply.  Prices will fall toward competitive levels, with each product retaining 
some market power to maintain price above competitive marginal cost levels.   
  Whether or not therapeutic substitutes have appeared, at some point the original 
drug will go off patent and generic competitors will enter.  As more generic firms enter, 
the generic price falls to competitive levels.  The original manufacturer may, however, 
produce a branded generic (e.g., Advil vs. the generic ibuprofen), which will command a 
price premium above generic or private labels. 
This no insurance case, however, is exceptional, since approximately 85 percent 
of Americans have insurance coverage, and most of those policies cover drugs. Medicare 
beneficiaries use about three times as many drugs as the under 65, and around 90 percent 
of them have coverage for drugs.
94  Thus, we next consider how the standard model 
needs to be modified for the case of an insured consumer.   
  The simplest case to analyze is an insurance policy with a constant coinsurance 
rate i (0 <  i ≤ 1), meaning the patient pays 100i percent of the cost; for mathematical 
convenience, we rule out the completely free case (i = 0).  Policies with non-zero 
coinsurance rates were relatively common when health insurance began to cover 
prescription drugs in the 1970s and 1980s.
95  They are much less common today, but still 
are found, e.g., Medicare coverage of drugs taken orally for persons who spend above a 
certain (large) amount out-of-pocket face a 5 percent coinsurance rate.
96   A 20 percent 
coinsurance rate applies currently in Medicare for drugs injected during an office visit.  
Although many beneficiaries have a supplementary insurance policy that covers the 20 
percent coinsurance amount, not all do. 
   We again begin with a drug with no close substitutes that is covered by such an 
insurance policy.  Examples would be Mevacor (lovastatin), which in 1987 became the 
first statin on the U.S. market, and Gleevec (imatinib), which was launched in 2001 and 
still (in 2010) has no close substitutes for the treatment of chronic myelogenous 
leukemia. How one specifies the resulting with insurance inverse demand curve is 
somewhat speculative, since modeling precisely how both insurers and insureds would 
respond to the sudden possibility of insurance raises challenging issues.  Let I
-1 = 1/i 
(note we have excluded the i=0 possibility).  One possibility is to specify the new market 
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  P = I
-1(a – bQ) = A – BQ,  where A = I
-1a  and  B  = I
-1 b.                            (4) 
Relative to the no insurance case, this with-insurance demand curve simply rotates 
clockwise and upward at the quantity demanded when the price equals zero (Figure 1); 
the actual rotation occurs where the demand curve intersects the q and Q axes as p and P* 
become zero, which from Eqns. (3) and (4) is where q =  a/b  and Q = A/B = I
-1a/ I
-1b = q.  
The slope of the new market demand curve becomes B = I
-1 b.  Let us assume cost 
functions are unchanged.  At the new with-insurance equilibrium (denoted with capital 
letters), from Eqn. (3) we see that P* becomes 
    P* = (A + d)/2 = (I
-1a  + d)/2                                                            (5) 
so that  
P*/p* = (I
-1a  + d)/(a + d).                                                                (6) 
As long as marginal cost d > 0 and the coinsurance rate follows 0 < i ≤ 1 , then  
1 < P*/p* < I
-1.                                                                                 (7) 
Only if marginal cost d = 0 will P*/p* =  I
-1.  In terms of quantity at the new with 
insurance equilibrium, from (3) we have that 
    Q* = (A – d)/2B = (I
-1a  - d)/2 I
-1 b.                                                (8) 
A bit of algebra reveals that 
    Q*/q* = (I
-1ab – bd)/ (I
-1ab – I
-1bd)                                                 (9) 
which implies that under insurance, as long as b, d > 0 and i < 1 which implies I
-1 > 1, the 
denominator of (9) will be smaller than the numerator, implying that the ratio Q*/q* > 1.  
Intuitively, the lower is the coinsurance rate i, the greater is Q* relative to q* -- 
equilibrium quantity with insurance relative to no insurance. Graphically, as seen in 
Figure 1, the effect of coinsurance on price is greater than that on quantity. 
  There are other possibilities, however.  Suppose that the “hardnosed” insurer 
announced that it would not pay any greater than the pre-insurance reservation price, but 
that it would provide very generous benefits at lower prices; consumers might also balk at 
paying the very large upfront insurance policy costs they realized would occur were the 
insurer be willing to pay prices much greater than the pre-insurance reservation price.  
Alternatively, as has been argued by some
97, suppose it was not just the presence of 
insurance, but the form that it takes that makes demand for drugs under insurance more 
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manufacturers to make price concessions.  In such an admittedly hypothetical situation, 
one could simply rotate the demand curve at the reservation price, and make its slope a 
much flatter i times the no insurance slope, i.e. specify a new market demand curve as 
    P = a – b‟Q = a – ibQ, where now b‟ = ib.                                  (10) 
Substituting in to Eqn. (3), at the new with “hardnosed” insurance equilibrium (denoted 
with capital letters and a prime, i.e. P‟ and Q‟), and assuming again no change in cost 
functions, we see that the equilibrium quantity is I
-1 times the no insurance quantity,  
Q‟ = (a – d)/2b‟ = (a-d)/2 ib = I
-1q*.                                          (11) 
However, since P‟ = (a + d)/2 is not a function of b‟, under this admittedly hypothetical 
scenario the impact of insurance is only a very large quantity and no price effect.  Recall 
that in contrast, the insurance scenario with the much larger reservation price involves a 
large price effect and a considerably smaller quantity impact.   
  Both of these insurance scenarios implicitly contain a number of unrealistic 
assumptions.  While the insurer‟s passive acceptance of a reservation price I
-1 times that 
occurring in a pre-insurance market is unlikely, a priori it seems even more unlikely that 
the insurer would not at least in some cases be willing to pay a higher reservation price 
than in the no insurance case.  The two insurance scenarios likely provide some upper 
and lower bounds on what is the impact of insurance on price and quantity demanded, 
with the insurer accepting higher reservation price scenario providing us the most useful 
intuition and guidance.  In such a scenario, if the manufacturer‟s profit-maximizing price 
was p* in an uninsured market, the profit maximizing price if everyone has an insurance 
policy with a coinsurance rate i is larger than p* but less than p*/i.  How large is the 
quantity effect relative to the price effect is at this point speculative.   
In the case of a drug with therapeutic substitutes, a similar analysis applies; the 
demand (willingness to pay) for all drugs rises by the factor I
-1, so the profit-maximizing 
prices of all drugs will rise by somewhat less than I
-1 times prices in an uninsured market.  
Moreover, equilibrium quantities will always be greater with than without insurance. 
  Policies with a non-zero coinsurance rate, however, have now mostly been 
replaced with copayments for drugs taken orally (i.e., tablets and capsules).  A common 
arrangement is a three or four tier formulary.  As of 2008, according to IMS data
98, a 
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medications, $29 for preferred branded drugs, and $40 or more for non-preferred branded 
drugs, all for 30-day prescriptions.
99 The difference between the copayment and the 
manufacturer‟s price is paid through the premium for the policy.  The different levels of 
copayments control relative out-of-pocket prices for various drugs.  This shifts demand 
toward generic drugs and drugs on the formulary; for branded drugs the device of the 
formulary effectively increases the elasticity of demand faced by the manufacturer (see 
the chapters by Goldman-Joyce, “Consumer Demand and Health Effects of Cost 
Sharing”, and by Pauly, “Insurance Design”).   
  As described above, if there is a fourth tier, instead of a fixed copayment it will 
have a coinsurance rate i.  As discussed earlier, drugs in this tier are often biologics with 
high unit prices, e.g., many thousands of dollars for a yearly supply.
100  For such drugs 
the coinsurance model described above applies.
101   
  Some therapeutic classes may have a large number of drugs, but any given patient 
may only do well on one or a few of them.  Analytically, of course, this simply means 
that the drugs in the class are not close substitutes, and that therefore the manufacturer of 
each branded drug in the relevant class has substantial market power.  Medicare has 
designated six protected therapeutic drug classes, in which drugs are thought not to be 
close substitutes.  Insurers that participate in Medicare Part D must offer all but one of 
the drugs in those six classes.
102 In the remaining drug classes insurers must only offer 
two drugs.  Nonetheless, within those classes drugs may have similar effects on the 
condition being treated but be differentiated by some having fewer side effects (the 
occurrence of side effects may well vary from person to person) or the frequency with 
which a patient must take the medication.  These differentiating features also give rise to 
price differences among drugs treating the same condition. 
B.  The Prescription Drug Insurance Market  
In the U.S. prescription drug insurance benefit services are typically purchased 
from a pharmacy benefits manager (PBM), usually by the underlying health insurer or as 
a “carve-out” policy by a large employer.  In the latter case the employer may offer 
medical insurance plans from multiple health insurers but require all of them to use one 
PBM to prevent selection on the basis of drug formularies or pharmacies.  Even if the 
employer contracts solely with one health insurer so that selection is not relevant, the Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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employer may carve out the drug benefit to a PBM not affiliated with that insurer because 
it is more economical.   
  The American PBM industry has become increasingly concentrated; at the 
beginning of 2010 it was dominated by three large firms (Caremark/CVS; 
ExpressScripts; Medco) who had a combined market share of just under 50 percent.
103 
Since each of the three large PBMs has substantial bargaining power with manufacturers, 
this increased concentration has served to increase the price elasticity of demand facing 
manufacturers with drugs that are highly substitutable within a therapeutic class. 
  Somewhat over 10 percent of the overall 2008 U.S. pharmaceutical market is 
accounted for by Medicaid and certain other federal programs such as the Veteran‟s 
Administration, Community Health Centers, and the military medical care system.
104 
(This share was larger prior to the implementation of Medicare Part D in 2006; see 
below.) These government programs purchase prescription drugs under legislation that 
sets prices to manufacturers as a discount off prices charged to commercial customers.  
The size of the discount varies by type of drug.  As noted above, the 2010 health care 
reform bill increased the discount off single source drugs (generally those on patent) from 
15 to 23.1 percent and off multiple source drugs from 11 to 13 percent.   
Scott Morton and Duggan and Scott Morton have demonstrated that these 
statutorily prescribed discounts have raised prices to other customers.
105  The reason is 
simple: if a manufacturer lowers price to a commercial customer, the manufacturer also 
must lower price to the government programs.  There will be little or no quantity 
response in the government market, since quantities are determined by prescribing 
decisions made by individual physicians who do not face a budget constraint when 
prescribing.  Hence, the optimal price in the commercial market must be greater than it 
would be without this tie between the commercial and government markets. 
C.  Welfare Implications of Market Power and Insurance   
Deriving welfare implications about drug prices and insurance is difficult for 
many reasons.  A first-best outcome would achieve both static efficiency -- the efficient 
allocation of drugs on the market at a point in time -- and dynamic efficiency -- the 
efficient allocation of R&D resources devoted to drugs.   Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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  It is best to begin with the simplest, albeit unrealistic case.  Assume that the 
patient is well informed and ignore agency issues with respect to the prescribing 
physician.  Static efficiency requires that price equal the marginal cost of production, 
which for most drugs will be negligible.  Dynamic efficiency, however, requires a price 
at which the R&D costs can be recouped.  (Marketing costs must also be recouped; see 
below.)  Achieving both static and dynamic efficiency simultaneously thus requires some 
sort of two-part pricing scheme, in which consumers pay little or nothing at the time of 
purchase, but prices received by manufacturers are sufficiently above marginal 
production cost to enable them to recoup R&D costs (including R&D on failed drug 
development efforts).   
  In principle, of course, drug insurance can achieve just such an efficient outcome.  
The consumer, or the employer or government on her behalf, pays a premium for the 
insurance and in turn the consumer receives a heavily discounted price at the time of 
purchase with the insurer using the proceeds from the premiums to pay the manufacturer 
a price above the marginal cost of production so that the manufacturer can recover R&D 
costs.  How close or far actual premiums and copayments come to inducing something 
approximating an economically efficient outcome is not known.
106 
  But the conflict between static and dynamically efficient prices is not the only 
difficulty in attaining an efficient outcome.  Consumer ignorance and resulting agency 
problems are omnipresent in this domain.  Because of their relative lack of knowledge 
and training, by law in the U.S. consumers must obtain a prescription from a physician to 
purchase most drugs.   But the physician also faces costs in acquiring information about 
drugs, and thus it pays a manufacturer to devote resources to marketing.  Although there 
has been much attention in the general press about direct-to-consumer advertising of 
prescription pharmaceuticals, the great bulk of pharmaceutical manufacturers‟ marketing 
efforts are directed toward physicians;
107 also see the Kenkel and Mathios chapter in this 
volume, “Promotion to Physicians and Consumers”.   Detailers (pharmaceutical sales 
representatives) visit physician offices, dispense free samples, pay opinion-leader 
physicians speaking fees, and offer physicians free “continuing education” - featuring 
that manufacturer‟s products of course – often at resorts or other desirable locations.  
Such marketing efforts are profitable given typically low marginal production costs, Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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which implies that any additional quantities of drug sold as a result of marketing efforts 
can contribute handsomely to profits.
108  Public controversy and lawsuits have occurred 
alleging that certain marketing practices may be considered unethical, and occasionally 
illegal.  In recent years, manufacturers have entered into a number of settlements 
involving their marketing efforts.
109  
Marketing efforts directed toward the physician create an agency problem; for 
example, the physician may rely on the manufacturer‟s representatives for information 
rather than spending the time and effort to seek information from a less biased source, 
potentially leading to prescribing a less than optimal drug for a patient – or perhaps 
prescribing when not prescribing at all would be the best treatment.  Physician 
investments in learning about the efficacy, tolerability and safety characteristics of 
various treatments involves costly investments which the physician must trade off with 
being able to see more patients and enjoy greater leisure time.  
  Even if the physician were perfectly informed about the effects of all treatments, 
however, consumers‟ lack of knowledge can be a barrier to efficiency.  Suppose the 
condition being treated has no immediate symptoms – hypertension is an example – but 
the drug being used to treat the condition has adverse side effects.  One possibility in this 
case is that the side effects are so bad or the consequences of the condition so mild or so 
far in the future that it is efficient not to take the drug.  In this case it can be efficient for 
the consumer not to take the drug.   
But even if it is efficient for the patient to take the drug, there are several barriers.  
Although the physician can in principle know the clinical consequences on average of 
taking or not taking the drug, he or she cannot know the patient‟s utility function 
including the patient‟s risk aversion.  Yet another possibility is simply that the patient is a 
poor decision maker with respect to probabilistic outcomes, especially in cases in which 
there is a certain small loss now (e.g., from side effects or simply from the copayments) 
in return for a larger gain later so the patient simply does not fill the prescription; Frank 
[2006] considers this and several related situations in the context of behavioral 
economics.  Physicians would characterize this scenario as an adherence or compliance 
problem.  This suggests setting copayments lower than they would be set if all consumers Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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were excellent decision makers, in effect, providing a greater inducement to comply; 
some call this “value-based pricing”.
110 
  Such a possibility is reinforced if lack of compliance generates greater use of non-
drug medical services than would otherwise be the case.  If, for example, a person with 
high blood pressure does not take the appropriate medication, s/he is at higher risk of 
cardiovascular disease and stroke.  In the event of, say, a stroke, there will be additional 
hospital, physician, and other medical care costs involved when treating the stroke.  
These costs, which will be mainly borne by others if the patient is insured, can potentially 
be avoided if the copayment is lowered to induce compliance.  This is analogous to 
raising taxes on cigarettes to deter consumption.
111.  An extreme example is directly 
observed therapy, in which those with an infectious disease (the usual example is 
tuberculosis) are paid to come in to an office or hospital to be observed taking drugs to 
treat the disease.  In effect, this is a negative copayment.
112 
  Value-based pricing has been implemented by a number of benefit plans.  
Evidence documents that in 2009, although 51.5% of employers surveyed had not 
adopted any value-based design tool, 28.6% reduced copayments for specific drug 
classes, 22.7% provided incentives to motivate behavior change, 7.9% reduced 
copayments for members with specific health conditions, and 6.1% reduced copayments 
tied to participation in care management programs.
113  
  IV.  Recent Developments, Issues and Emerging Trends 
  We now move on to a discussion of recent developments, controversies and 
emerging trends.  As noted earlier, many drug benefit plans offer tiered formularies; in 
one recent survey, 86.9% of employers using a formulary have it structured with multiple 
tiers, with the dominant being three or more tiers, although there is an increasing trend to 
use four or more tiers (4.7% in 2007, 12.7% in 2009).  Coinsurance is giving way to fixed 
dollar copayments (except for a fourth tier, if it exists); in 2009 (2007), 18.3% (20.9%) of 
responding employers with multiple tiers utilized a multitier coinsurance design, while 
81.7% (79.1%) had multitier fixed dollar copayment provisions.
114  In terms of mail 
order, the same survey indicated that 96.7% of employers offered access to mail service 
pharmacy to dispense maintenance medications used to treat chronic conditions, while Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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17.4% required maintenance medications be dispensed by mail order (“mandatory 
mail”).
115 
A.  Major Long-Term Trends 
  There are very clear trends over time in dollar copayments by tier, less so for 
coinsurance.  As seen in Table 1, between 1998 and 2009, average retail copayment 
levels increased from $6.13 to $9.96, an increase of 62%.  Tier 2 average copayments 
increased even more, from $11.10 in 1998 to $25.19 in 2009, an increase of 127%.  But 
Tier 3 average copayments rose the most, from $17.53 in 1998 to $42.95 in 2009, an 
increase of 145%.  As expected, the 2009 average retail Tier 4 copayment is even greater 
at $62.11, a tier that covers specialty drugs; the PBMI report notes that average 
copayment levels for “lifestyle” drugs in 2009 was $36.00.
116    
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                                                                   Table 1 
  Average Retail Copayment Levels and Coinsurance Rates, by Tier, 1998-2009 
 
                     Average Copayment Levels             Average Coinsurance Rates 
    Year     Tier 1     Tier 2     Tier 3     Tier 4*    Tier 1     Tier 2     Tier 3     Tier 4* 
     
    1998    $ 6.13    $11.10   $17.53         na          na           na           na           na 
    1999       7.05      12.82     23.40         na          na           na           na           na 
    2000       7.17      14.14     27.35         na        19%        21%        42%        na 
    2001       7.68      16.06     30.51         na          na           na           na           na 
    2002       8.33      17.57     33.23         na        19%        23%        37%        na 
    2003       8.66      19.26     35.15         na        20%        26%        40%        na 
    2004       9.14      20.71     37.45         na          na            na           na         na 
    2005/6    9.53      21.61     39.06         na          na           na            na         na 
    2007       8.99      23.08     39.63         na         18%       26%       38%       27%  
    2008       9.53      24.62     41.13         na         20%       26%       42%       29%  
    2009       9.96      25.19     42.95     62.11        20%       27%       40%       28%  
 
*Tier 4 are specialty drugs.  na is data not available.  Source: 1998-2000 data, Takeda-
Lilly [2001]; 2001-3 data, Takeda [2004]; 2004-9 data, Pharmacy Benefit Management 
Institute [2009]. 
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  While retail coinsurance rates generally increase from Tier 1 to Tier 3 (roughly, 
doubling from 20% to 40%), there is no discernable trend over time in Tiers 1 and 3, 
although there is some evidence suggesting an upward trend in Tier 2 over time.  Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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Interestingly, Tier 4 coinsurance rate data, although available only for the last three years, 
do not suggest any trend, but at 28% are about the same as Tier 2 coinsurance rates, both 
being less than the 40% in Tier 3 coinsurance. 
  In Table 2 we present dollar copayment and coinsurance rate data by tier over 
time for mail order prescriptions; for daily medications, these are usually 90 days of 
therapy, three times a monthly amount.  Levels and trends differ from retail in several 
interesting ways.  First, for Tier 1 average mail order copayment increased 135% from 
$8.62 to $20.23; relative to 30 day retail, the mail order copayment ratio increased from 
1.41 in 1998 to 2.03 in 2009; this might reflect plans‟ initially trying to incent patients to 
obtain three times the number of days of therapy for only 1.4 times the copayment cost, 
but once having done so, gradually upping the retail copayment, thereby sharing the gains 
of mail order equally with payer and patient.  Between 1998 and 2009, mail order 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                   Table 2 
Average Mail Order Copayment Levels and Coinsurance Rates, by Tier, 1998-2009 
 
                     Average Copayment Levels             Average Coinsurance Rates 
    Year     Tier 1     Tier 2     Tier 3     Tier 4*    Tier 1     Tier 2     Tier 3     Tier 4* 
     
    1998    $ 8.62    $15.12   $26.46         na          na           na           na           na 
    1999       9.74      17.96     37.67         na          na           na           na           na 
    2000      10.78     21.29     45.73         na        18%        21%        58%        na 
    2001      12.60     26.01     55.23         na          na           na           na           na 
    2002      14.61     31.21     60.61         na        18%        23%        41%        na 
    2003      16.63     37.33     67.55         na        21%        25%        43%        na 
    2004      17.18     39.90     74.85         na          na            na           na         na 
    2005/6  17.95      41.65     77.05         na          na           na            na         na 
    2007     17.58      47.86     80.80         na         19%       25%       38%       27%  
    2008     19.23      51.47     85.77         na         19%       25%       40%       26%  
    2009     20.23      51.70     99.04    117.79       19%       28%       43%       29%  
 
*Tier 4 are specialty drugs.  na is data not available.  Source: 1998-2000 data, Takeda-
Lilly [2001]; 2001-3 data, Takeda [2004]; 2004-9 data, Pharmacy Benefit Management 
Institute [2009]. 
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copayments increased by a greater percentage for Tier 2 (242%) and Tier 3 (275%) than 
they did for prescriptions dispensed at retail.  With regards to coinsurance, mail order Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
Page 46 
 
levels and trends are generally very similar to those at retail.  Note that even though there 
may not be trends over time within each tier in coinsurance rates, to the extent 
prescription drug prices are increasing, the dollar amounts associated with fixed 
coinsurance rates increase over time as well.   
  In Table 3 we report average percent discounts off AWP and average dispensing 
fees for brands, as reported by employers who are either self-insured or fully insured, 
separately for retail and mail order.  Between 1995 and 2009, both the retail and mail  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                             Table 3 
 
                   Trends in Retail and Mail Order Reimbursement, 1995 - 2009  
       Average Percentage Discounts Off Brand AWP and Average Dispensing Fee 
 
                                                Retail                            Mail Order                                       
                                     Discount    Dispensing    Discount    Dispensing 
                         Year    Off AWP         Fee          Off AWP         Fee 
 
                         1995      11.8%         $2.50            15.0%         $1.82   
                         1996      12.1              2.47            15.6               1.71 
                         1997      12.6              2.32            16.6               1.61 
                         1998      13.2              2.35            17.1               1.51 
                         1999      13.1              2.30            17.4               1.38    
 
                         2000      13.5              2.31            18.5               1.15 
                         2001      13.9              2.21            18.9               1.09 
                         2002      14.1              2.13            19.7               0.86 
                         2003      14.5              2.05            20.4               0.52 
                         2004      14.8              1.95            21.0               0.41 
  
                         2005/6  15.3              1.88             21.9              0.24  
                         2007     16.1              1.88             22.7                 * 
                         2008     16,1              1.73             20,2                 *  
                         2009     16.4              1.57             23.7                 * 
 
Notes:  *In 2008 (2009), only 20.3% (13%) of employers paid dispensing fee on mail 
prescriptions.  For those who did pay a mail dispensing fee, 2007-9 average dispensing 
fees were $1.62, $2.17 and $3.19, respectively.  Data Sources:  1995-2002 data, Takeda 
[2004}; 2003-9 data, Pharmacy Benefit Management Institute [2009]. 
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order discount off AWP paid by employers to PBMs and pharmacies increased about 
50%, not quite five percentage points for retail (from 11.8% to 16.4%), and not quite nine 
percentage points for mail order (from 15.0% to 23.8%).  This increase in discounts over 
time is consistent both with PBMs gaining bargaining power, and with declining 
wholesaler margins.   
  An equally noteworthy trend is the decline in dispensing fees, both for retail and 
mail order.  For retail, the average dispensing fee declined 37% between 1995 and 2009, 
from $2.50 to $1.57.  The decline in the average mail order dispensing fee is even more 
pronounced, falling 87% from $1.82 in 1995 to $0.24 in 2005/6.  As the notes to Table 4 
indicate, by 2008 and 2009, only 20.3% and 13% of employers, respectively, paid a mail 
order dispensing fee, with 79.7% and 87% providing a zero dispensing fee to mail order 
service providers.    
  These trends in retail and mail order dispensing fees, as well as in discounts off 
AWP, reflect the changing relative bargaining power of PBMs, manufacturers and 
pharmacies, as well as continuing cost-saving technological advances in information and 
communication technologies that facilitate electronic communications among them.  Two 
observations are worth noting.  First, with discounts off AWP increasing and dispensing 
fees decreasing, pharmacy gross margins are likely decreasing, at least for transactions 
involving private sector payers; we discuss this further below.  Second, as was noted 
earlier and documented by numerous CBO and Office of Inspector General Studies, as 
well as others, reimbursement by public sector payers, particularly Medicaid, have been 
considerably more generous to pharmacies than have private sector payers, with state 
Medicaid agencies paying higher dispensing fees and discounting AWP less, both for 
brand and generic drugs than their private sector counterparts.
117  
  In Table 4 we report trends over time in generic dispensing rates – the proportion 
of all brand plus generic prescriptions dispensed as generics – separately for retail and 
mail order.  Recall that the extent to which generics can be dispensed depends critically 
on the proportion of patent and off-patent drugs.  As the number of new drugs approved 
by the FDA has generally fallen since their peak numbers in 1995-96, an echo resounds 
12-15 years later as they go off patent and encounter generic competition, implying that Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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the proportion of all distinct molecules that are still patent protected falls over time as 
well, thereby facilitating increases in generic dispensing rates.
118 
 
 
                                                               Table 4 
 
                           Average Retail and Mail Order Generic Dispensing Rates 
                  Percent of Prescriptions Dispensed Through Mail Service, 2000-2009 
 
                 Percent Generic         Percent                        Percent Generic        Percent 
Year     Retail     Mail Order    Mail Order    Year   Retail    Mail Order   Mail Order 
 
2000    39.0%         28.0%          14.2%              2006/6    51.0%      39.0%                         
2001    40.4                                                            2007    54.5          41.7             18.2* 
2002    41.5            31.8              13.0                    2008    60.4          49.3             17.8* 
2003    44.1            34.0              16.0                    2009    63.5          53.6         
2004    47.0            38.0 
 
Data Sources:  2000 data, Takeda-Lilly [2001]; 2001-2 data, Takeda [2003]; 2003 data, 
Takeda [2004]; 2004-9 data, Pharmacy Benefit Management Institute [2009]; *Fein 
[2009]. 
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As seen in Table 4, between 2000 and 2009, retail generic dispensing rates have 
increased more than 20 percentage points, from 39% to 63.5%, a 63% proportional 
increase.
119   Although at lower percentage levels in each year than retail, mail order 
generic dispensing rates have increased proportionately even more, from 28% to 53.6%, a 
91% proportional increase.  Note that from the vantage point of employers paying drug 
insurance benefits, since mail order discounts off AWP for on patent brands are greater 
than those at retail, it is less costly on a per day of therapy basis to have branded 
maintenance medications for chronic conditions dispensed by mail order than at retail.  
Thus it is not surprising that the proportion of prescriptions dispensed by brand is greater 
for mail order (46.4% in 2009) than for retail (36.5%).
120  Another trend worth noting, 
though at this point based on relatively sparse data, involves the proportion of all 
prescriptions dispensed via mail order.  As seen in Table 4, this proportion appears to be 
increasing over time, from about 14% at the turn of the century to around 18% by 2009.  
Note that since mail order dispenses a greater proportion of more costly brands than does Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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retail, the proportion of revenues flowing through the mail order channel is greater than 
the proportion of prescriptions. 
One final long term trend worth highlighting here is the growth in specialty drugs, 
primarily (but not exclusively) physician-administered biologics.  According to one 
integrated retailer-PBM, spending on specialty drugs accounted for 12% of all drug 
spending in 2008, up from 8% three years earlier.
121  To gain bargaining power, retailer-
PBM firms are attempting to have their clients exclusively use their network for single-
source specialty management for all drugs to treat cancer except those used in hospital 
settings.
122   
Many of the specialty drugs, however, are used for treating cancer.  Fifteen years 
ago, according to one observer, the only cancer drug on the market that cost more than 
$2,500 per month was paclitaxel (Taxol, Bristol-Myers Squibb).
123  As seen in Figure 2 
below, the number of cancer drugs charging many times that amount has increased 
sharply in the last several decades.
124  For example, in 2007 Genentech‟s Avastin  
 
 
Figure 2: Monthly and Median Costs of Cancer Drugs at the Time of 
Approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), from 1965 through 
2008.  Source:  Bach [2009].  
           
(colorectal cancer) cost on average $42,960, its Herceptin (breast cancer) cost $27,900, 
and GlaxoSmith Kline‟s Tykerb (breast cancer) cost $16,575 per course of treatment.
125  Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
Page 50 
 
Partly in response to these high unit prices, many Medicare Part D insurers have placed 
these drugs on a special tier that typically requires 25 percent coinsurance.  This induces 
some demand responsiveness, but the high prices are consistent with a relatively low 
price elasticity of demand by cancer patients.  Medicare, however, covers physician-
administered drugs – and many of the cancer drugs are physician administered – under 
Part B rather than Part D, and Part B has 20% coinsurance.   The Part B coinsurance, 
however, is frequently covered by some kind of supplemental insurance, most often 
retiree health insurance from a prior employer or Medicaid, in which case the insured 
may have little or no copayment.  The existence of such supplemental insurance likely 
increases both the profit-maximizing price and quantity of the drugs covered under Part B 
(see Figure 1). 
B.   Emerging Issues and Trends Affecting Pharmaceutical Pricing 
We now move on to a discussion of several prominent emerging issues and trends 
involving pharmaceutical pricing.  
  B.1   Part D, Pharmaceutical Prices and Pharmacy Gross Margins 
As we noted in our theoretical discussion earlier, it is plausible to expect that 
prices of covered drugs would generally be expected to be greater under insurance than 
without insurance; the extent of price increase can to some extent be offset depending on 
how concentrated is the buying and negotiating power of insurers and PBMs acting on 
behalf of the previously under- and uninsured.   Issues regarding the effects of expanded 
drug coverage on drug prices and pharmacy margins recently emerged again with the 
implementation of Medicare Part D benefits on January 1, 2006. 
Overall, Part D appeared to reduce optimal prices for drugs, which seems  
contrary to the logic of Figure 1 above.
126 The reason, however, is straightforward: Part D 
subsidized Medicare beneficiaries to purchase a private insurance plan, and around 90 
percent of the individuals enrolled in those plans chose plans with formularies.  Before 
Part D a quarter of Medicare beneficiaries were cash paying customers (i.e., they had no 
insurance for drugs), whereas after they enrolled in a Part D plan, they in effect had a 
purchasing agent, the PBM or in Medicare terms the Prescription Drug Plan (PDP), that 
bargained on their behalf with pharmaceutical manufacturers on the basis of price, using 
the threat to place any given drug on a higher tier of the formulary in order to obtain a Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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better price.  In short, the demand from the formerly cash-paying segment of the 
Medicare population became more, not less elastic with the acquisition of insurance, and 
this drove prices down. 
Not surprisingly, utilization of drugs increased post Part D because of the lower 
out-of-pocket prices paid by consumers.  (Although around 75 percent of Medicare 
beneficiaries had at least some drug insurance before Part D, Part D improved the 
generosity of the insurance for the majority of them; that is, it lowered the out-of-pocket 
prices they paid.  For example, many Medicare beneficiaries prior to Part D had limits of 
$500-1,250 on the amount of drug spending covered in a year.)  Duggan and Scott 
Morton [2010] estimate a large utilization effect from Part D, but it is imprecisely 
estimated.  Zhang et al. [2009] estimate that for a subset of beneficiaries enrolled in an 
HMO who had no prior drug coverage, utilization increased 74 percent.  Moreover, they 
estimate that for this group the increased cost of drugs was more than offset by decreased 
costs for hospital and physician spending, most likely because beneficiaries better 
adhered to the medication regimens prescribed for their chronic diseases.  By contrast, 
another group with reasonably generous drug insurance prior to Part D increased 
utilization only 11 percent; moreover, hospital and physician spending in this group 
actually increased, perhaps because the increase in drugs meant too many drugs were 
now being used with concomitant adverse effects. 
As noted by Frank and Newhouse, an additional feature of Part D partially offset 
the overall downward effect on prices of shifting cash paying customers to PDPs that 
used a formulary.
 127  Specifically, Part D also shifted the drug coverage of those 
Medicare beneficiaries eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare from Medicaid to PDPs.  
This meant manufacturers were able to obtain higher prices for this dually eligible group, 
because they had previously been paid under the discount rules off the best commercial 
price that we described earlier in this chapter.   (The law did not allow the PDPs to buy at 
the rules governing Medicaid prices for this dually eligible group.)   The expectation was 
that any price rise relative to the best-price Medicaid system would be modest.  For 
unique drugs, however, particularly those used primarily by senior citizens, price 
increases could have been substantial. Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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Unfortunately this prediction is impossible to verify directly because AMP and 
PDP prices are confidential and protected by statute.  Hence, one cannot compare 
Medicaid and PDP prices for drugs heavily used by dual eligibles.  Examining Form 10-
Q filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission by pharmaceutical firms, 
however, Frank and Newhouse report that all the manufacturers of branded antipsychotic 
drugs, 70% of which were purchased by Medicaid prior to 2006, reported “favorable 
changes in prices that resulted from the shift of large numbers of users of antipsychotic 
medications from Medicaid to Part D”, leading Frank and Newhouse to conclude “The 
implication is that prices have increased.”
128 
Frank and Newhouse carried out one other test of this prediction.  They compared 
2004-6 brand price changes with high shares (55% or more) of elderly purchasers and 
those with relatively low shares (35% or less) of elderly purchasers.  They report that 
prices for drugs used more heavily by the elderly grew 24.2% over the three years 
compared with 18.8% for those less heavily used.
129  Moreover, prices of drugs sold to 
the elderly grew at a more rapid rate after August 2004 (several months after the 
December 2003 signing of the Part D legislation, but before the January 2006 
implementation) than before.
130   These greater price increases for drugs used relatively 
intensively by the elderly had not been observed in earlier studies, which showed no 
differences in price inflation for elderly vs. non-elderly intensive drugs, probably because 
there was no insurance shock analogous to the implementation of Part D.
131 
One other study worth noting in this context is that by Lakdawalla and Yin 
[2009], who examine whether greater concentration among PDP purchasers offering Part 
D plans allows them to obtain lower prices for their members. Unlike monopoly power 
for producers, monopsony power for purchasers can result in consumers‟ experiencing 
price decreases as market power increases – the more enrollees a PDP has, the more 
bargaining power it has with pharmacies and drug manufacturers – so long as the PDP 
market does not get so concentrated that PDPs are able to charge consumers a large 
markup over their costs.  Lakdawalla and Yin examine claims data from a large national 
retail pharmacy.  These data contain the drug prices negotiated between the pharmacy 
and every insurer with which it contracted and cover prescriptions dispensed between 
September 2004 and April 2007, before and after implementation of Part D on January 1, Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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2006.  They find that insurers that experienced larger enrollment increases due to Part D 
implementation negotiated lower drug prices with the pharmacy.  (Note that the insurer 
may have been negotiating with the pharmacy on the basis of both its commercial or 
under 65 business as well as its Medicare business.)  More specifically, they find that 
enrolling an additional 100,000 members is associated with a 2.5% decrease in drug 
prices and a 5% decrease in pharmacy profits earned on prescriptions filled by enrollees 
of that insurer.  Further, PDPs appear to have used their increased bargaining power to 
reduce margins at pharmacies for multiple source generic drugs, but were much less 
successful in leveraging additional enrollments into lower prices for on patent branded 
drugs. 
A closely related issue is the impact of Part D on pharmacy margins.  While 
greater insurance coverage increased overall prescription utilization, benefiting brick and 
mortar pharmacies, pharmacies‟ gross margins could have nonetheless declined following 
implementation of Part D because they had previously been able to earn very high 
margins on underinsured and insured cash customers who now had Part D coverage.  
According to the CVS Caremark 2007 10-K Securities and Exchange Commission filing, 
in fact pharmacy margins did decline after Part D: 
“The Medicare Drug Benefit became effective on January 1, 2006.  Since its  
inception the program has resulted in increased utilization and decreased 
pharmacy gross margin rates as higher margin business (such as cash and state 
Medicaid customers) migrated to the new Medicare Part D coverage.”
132   
 
Similar to their bargaining with drug manufacturers over drug prices, the insurers that sell 
Part D plans also bargain with pharmacies over dispensing fees.  Their bargaining power, 
however, is constrained by access rules that require 90 percent of urban and suburban 
Medicare beneficiaries to live within two and five miles, respectively, of a pharmacy.
133  
Nonetheless, for the same reason as it did for drug manufacturers, demand facing retail 
pharmacies likely became more price elastic following the implementation of Part D.   
B.2  Disintermediating PBMs and Preferred Pharmacy Networks 
            Another interesting emerging trend involves the substantial profits earned on 
generic drugs by both the retail and mail order pharmacy sectors.  In September 2006 
mass merchandiser giant retailer Wal-Mart announced it was offering a number of 30-day Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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generic drugs for a price of $4 per prescription.  About a year later Wal-Mart expanded 
the list of available generic drugs and simultaneously added a new 90-day prescription 
for a price of $9 per prescription, implying a dime per day cost of that prescription.
134  A 
Wal-Mart spokesperson called this the “commoditization” of generic drugs, made 
possible in part by its buying directly from generic manufacturers and bypassing 
wholesalers.
135   
Recall that customers with third party insurance usually pay the same copayment 
regardless of the retail or mail order pharmacy from which they purchase (as long as the 
pharmacy is in the insurer‟s network, which is usually the case).  Moreover, as seen in 
Tables 1 and 2 above, on average in 2007 the Tier 1 copayment for 30 day prescriptions 
at retail was $8.99, and for 90-day via mail order was $17.58, which in both cases is more 
than twice the cash price offered by Wal-Mart.
136  What Wal-Mart was doing was its 
classic tactic -- utilizing its enormous purchasing power to underprice its retail 
competitors, in this case, even underpricing the copayments charged by traditional retail 
and mail order pharmacies.  
For underinsured and uninsured cash paying customers, however, the savings 
from having their prescriptions dispensed at Wal-Mart could be much larger. According 
to one observer, a Wal-Mart official stated that while it always files a claim on behalf of 
its insured customers, it often does not seek reimbursement from payers, even at times 
waiving dispensing fees offered by Medicaid.
137  Since federal law mandates that 
pharmacies cannot be reimbursed by Medicaid for more than its Usual & Customary 
(“U&C”) charges and since these $4 and $9 were now clearly Wal-Mart‟s U&C charges, 
when it was seeking reimbursement for dispensing to Medicaid beneficiaries, Wal-Mart 
typically filed a claim involving smaller reimbursement than that sought by chain and 
independent retail and mail order pharmacies; state Medicaid agencies thus benefited 
whenever a beneficiary filled out a prescription at Wal-Mart rather than at other 
pharmacies.
138 Apparently even at only $4, at least for the specific generic drugs Wal-
Mart had available, the $4 revenue more than covered Wal-Mart‟s acquisition and 
dispensing costs, generating a positive gross margin.
139 Note that like other pharmacies, 
Wal-Mart pharmacies have high fixed costs (pharmacy license, pharmacists, insurance, 
rented space, etc.) relative to the marginal costs of dispensing, implying that as pharmacy Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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volume increases, even with constant marginal cost, Wal-Mart‟s average dispensing cost 
will fall.   Moreover, to the extent the $4 and $9 offers incentivized more customers to 
come to Wal-Mart, the increase in its foot traffic likely had a further positive impact on 
its non-drug sales and profits.   
Within months, a number of other mass merchandisers and food stores, such as 
Target, Kroger, Safeway and Giant Food, followed Wal-Mart and began offering very 
low priced generics, aimed particularly at cash customers.  The first retail pharmacy 
chain to respond was Walgreens, which in June 2008 introduced the Walgreens 
Prescription Savings Club, offering a 3-month supply of over 400 generics for $12.99 
(plus an annual membership fee).
140    
Then in September 2008 Wal-Mart announced an agreement with Peoria, Illinois 
based Caterpillar by which Wal-Mart would charge a zero copay for Caterpillar‟s 70,000 
beneficiaries on 2,500 generic drugs, but if Caterpillar‟s beneficiaries chose to fill their 
prescriptions at other retail pharmacies, they would pay the normal $5 generic copay. 
Notably, Wal-Mart had 12 stores near Peoria, where most of Caterpillar‟s employees 
lived. Also as part of the agreement, Caterpillar‟s PBM (RESTAT) agreed to reimburse 
Wal-Mart based on Wal-Mart‟s actual invoice prices on drugs.  The Wal-Mart – 
Caterpillar agreement not only took away profits from sales of generic drugs at retail and 
mail order pharmacies, but it also conveyed its potential to disintermediate other 
PBMs.
141   
With this agreement, Wal-Mart and Caterpillar reintroduced the heavily restricted 
network differential copayment concept into pharmacy benefits, a concept implemented 
for hospitals and physicians in the early 1990s with managed care, but later largely 
discarded because of consumers‟ wanting freedom of choice without paying differentially 
for it. (Insurers continued to have networks, but the great majority of hospitals and 
physicians were in-network.)  Recent news events, however, suggest that employers are 
returning to a more restrictive or preferred network concept, particularly for physicians 
and hospitals.
142  Interestingly, in November 2009 Caterpillar announced extension of its 
preferred pharmacy network effective January 2010, adding Walgreens to Wal-Mart as 
the only sites at which generic copayments for generic drugs would be zero; at other Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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pharmacies generic copayments would be higher, and customers would need to initially 
pay cash, and then fill out various forms to claim reimbursement.
143   
In November 2008, the combined PBM-retail chain CVS-Caremark announced a 
new Health Savings Plan that let customers buy 90 day supplies of over 400 generics for 
$9.99 (plus a $10 annual enrollment fee) either through its mail order or at its retail sites, 
calling this “channel neutrality”, and noting that it hoped by shifting its 90-day mail order 
prescriptions to its retail stores, it would increase foot traffic there.
144       
Notably, these developments involved generic drugs, drugs that have numerous 
manufacturers competing with each other for sales, and that are still the source of 
considerable profits for PBMs, mail order and retail pharmacies.  As we have noted 
earlier, the market for on-patent brands is very different, with exclusive manufacturers 
not having to compete as aggressively on price as do generic manufacturers.  Whether 
discount retailers will team up with other geographically concentrated employers in 
offering differential copayments and preferred pharmacy networks for on-patent branded 
products remains to be seen. 
    B.3  Pricing Transparency and Cost-Plus Pricing 
As we have noted many times in this chapter, numerous pharmaceutical-related 
transactions occur at prices that are not publicly observed.  Within health care this is not 
unique to pharmaceuticals – it also occurs with hospitals and other providers – but for 
pharmaceuticals it has been a prominent and controversial issue. 
In terms of actual acquisition costs, while the Average Sales Price (ASP) is now 
publicly posted, for new products (including new generics) during the first two quarters 
on the market, the manufacturer can report WAC as its ASP, and in those two quarters 
pharmacies and other providers will be reimbursed by Medicare at 1.06*WAC.  As actual 
prices of generics typically fall very rapidly following extensive generic entry, for the 
two quarters following initial extensive generic entry pharmacies‟ actual acquisition costs 
are likely to be considerably less than WAC, particularly since WAC is a list rather than a 
transaction price, implying that for these two quarters retail and mail order profits from 
generics will continue to be substantial. 
As we noted earlier, regarding AMP and Medicaid reimbursement, while under 
the 2010 health care reform legislation the AMP will now be publicly available, the set of Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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transactions it covers is smaller than before, and as we write this chapter (August 2010) 
details of how AMP will be determined for new brand and generic products remain to be 
worked out. 
More generally, it should not be surprising that the initial set of pharmaceuticals 
for which greater transparency in pricing is occurring, particularly in the private sector, is 
generic drugs.  As noted earlier, Wal-Mart and others view generic drugs as being 
commodities, and in commodity markets with relatively homogenous products, 
incentives to keep price proprietary are relatively weak; indeed, price competition tends 
to be particularly strong in commodity markets --  markets that approach the 
microeconomic ideal of perfect competition.  Might certain physician procedures and 
hospitalizations become “commoditized” in the near future?  Walk-in clinics at large 
retailers may be an embryonic form of such commoditization.
145  The obstacles are 
considerable, but so too are pressures for cost reductions.  We shall see. 
One interesting aspect of moving to cost-plus pricing with audited or public actual 
acquisition costs is a reduction in incentives for pharmacies and PBMs to minimize their 
costs, and indeed the creation of perverse incentives to increase the cost base on which 
the “plus factor” is calculated.  In the electric utility industry, cost-plus pricing was seen 
to create incentives for utilities to become too capital intensive, and not aggressively 
attempt to minimize generation and distribution costs.
146  Will the movement to 
reimburse pharmacies on cost-plus for generic drugs reduce their incentives to purchase 
at lowest prices from generic manufacturers? 
For branded and other differentiated product markets, particularly for the many 
pharmaceuticals for which marginal costs are much smaller than average costs and for 
which consumers‟ preferences and valuations are heterogeneous, we can expect that 
individual manufacturers will find it profitable to employ price discrimination tools, 
negotiating distinct prices with groups representing beneficiaries with varying demand 
elasticities, and wanting to keep these transactions price out of the public eye.  Indeed, 
particularly for those organizations such as staff model HMOs (e.g., Kaiser) that have 
strong bargaining positions due to their restrictive formularies and networks, resulting in 
ability to move market share, transparent pricing is an undesirable outcome.  Rather, for 
them “the best deal is a secret deal”.
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In summary, while the share of prescriptions dispensed as generics has generally 
been increasing in the U.S. over the last decade, generating substantial margins for retail 
pharmacies, the introduction of Medicare Part D shifted formerly cash paying customers 
to insured customers benefiting from the bargaining power of PDPs, thereby reducing 
manufacturer and retail pharmacy gross margins.  Medicare Part D also shifted dual 
Medicare and Medicaid eligibles from Medicaid to PDPs, increasing revenues for 
manufacturers but likely decreasing margins for retail pharmacies, as Medicaid 
reimbursement to pharmacies has traditionally been more generous than that by the 
private sector insurers.  It is likely that demand facing retail pharmacies became more 
price elastic following the implementation of Part D.  A notable recent development is 
the entry of retail mass merchandiser giants such as Wal-Mart into the low price generic 
market segment, offering low 30- and 90-day prescription prices, and disintermediating 
both traditional pharmacy retail chains and PBMs.  By offering differentially lower 
copays at preferred pharmacy networks, the mass merchandise retailers are creating 
additional price competition for generic pharmaceuticals.  Whether the 
“commoditization” of generic drugs will expand to other types of medical services 
remains to be seen.  Berndt and Newhouse “Draft Handbook Pricing Chapter” 
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